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INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes the relationship between shareholders and
managers.' Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means share credit for bringing
manager-shareholder relationships out of the boardroom and into the
"Street." In their 1932 book, The Modem Corporation and Private Prop-
1 This Article assumes that the role of corporate managers should be to maximize
the wealth of shareholders. It is not the purpose of this Article to examine whether share-
holder wealth maximization should be the only goal of managers.
1995]
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erly, 2 Berle and Means argued that large public corporations are not
controlled by their owners, the shareholders, but rather by managers,
who are effectively immune from discipline by diffuse and disorga-
nized groups of shareholders. Subsequent theorists have focused on
two main issues identified by Berle and Means: (1) the extent and
legitimacy of managerial discretion and (2) the ability and willingness
of shareholders to monitor and discipline managers. Over time differ-
ent theories have been proposed to illuminate these issues.
One such view is "managerialist" theory, which grew out of Berle
and Means's findings and was influential until the mid-1970s. 3
Managerialists assert that managers enjoy too much discretion, espe-
cially with respect to decisions regarding investments and the distribu-
tion of corporate profits. For example, managers' interest in
maximizing their compensation 4 gives them an incentive to choose
investment projects that will increase the size of the firm, even if these
decisions will not maximize shareholder wealth. 5 While managerial-
ists recognize that managers are subject to the disciplining effect of
some market and non-market constraints,6 they see these constraints
as very weak.7 Legal academics holding a managerialist view contend
that managerial discretion should be curbed through greater legal
intervention.8
2 ADoLF A BERLE,JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
3 Managerialist theory is now enjoying a revival of sorts in some quarters. See, e.g.,
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & AARON S. EDLIN, DISCOURAGING RIVALS: MANAGERIAL RENT SEEKING
AND ECONOMIC INSUFFICIENCIES (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
No. 4145, 1992).
4 This includes both pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensation, such as corporate
perquisites and greater power, prestige, and leisure. See generally ROBIN MARRIS, THE ECO-
NOMIC THEORY OF "MANAGERIAL" CAPITAUSM 46-109 (1964) (analyzing the economic, socio-
logical, and psychological motivations of corporate managers).
5 In this respect, managerialist theory is in agreement with Michael Jensen's "free
cash flow" theory. Where the theories differ is inJensen's belief that the market for corpo-
rate control and the incurrence of corporate debt will lead to great reductions in the mis-
use of free cash flows. See Michael C.Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance,
and Takeovers, 76 Am. ECON. REV., May 1986, at 323 [hereinafter Jensen, Free Cash Flow].
6 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR VALUE AND GROWTH 33-44 (1959)
(managers are subject to a minimum profit constraint); Robin Marris, A Model of the "Mana-
gerial Enterprise", 77 QJ. ECoN. 185 (1963) (the market for corporate control acts as a
constraint).
7 In fact, managerialist literature usually takes managerial discretion as a given and
focuses on identifying what goals managers actually pursue. See STIGLrz & EDLIN, supra
note 3.
8 See RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); Victor Brudney,
Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contrac, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1430-
42 (1985) [hereinafter Brudney, Corporate Governance]; Victor Brudney, The Independent Di-
rector-Heavenly City orPotemkin VdIlage?, 95 HARV. L REv. 597 (1982).
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The mid-1970s saw the development, by several economic and
legal writers, of an agency theory of the firm.9 Agency theorists agree
with managerialists that managers have an incentive to maximize their
compensation packages, but disagree with managerialists' claims that
managers enjoy too much discretion, for which regulatory interven-
tion is required. Agency theorists argue that market and contractual
constraints greatly reduce managerial discretion, ultimately confining
it to the optimal level in an imperfect world.' 0 Legal academics who
advance the agency theory of the firm argue that the legal interven-
tion advocated by managerialists would generally make matters worse
by interfering with the proper functioning of market and contractual
mechanisms;" according to agency theorists, the "problem" of share-
holder apathy identified by managerialists is merely a "rational" reac-
tion to the collective action problems' 2 inherent in shareholder
voting. 1
9 For a more detailed discussion of the agency theory of the firm and its weaknesses,
see infra part I.
10 Agency theorists reach this conclusion because, unlike neoclassical economic theo-
rists, they assume a world with positive monitoring and enforcement costs. Failure to do
that would be committing what they call the "Nirvana Fallacy." See Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Stncture, 3J. FIN. ECON. 805, 328 (1976) (citing Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency:
Another Viewpoin4 12J.L. ECON. 1 (1969)).
11 See, e.g., FRANK H. E.ASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 34-35 (1991) [hereinafter EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE] (corporate law is characterized as a set of "off-the-rack" rules that help supplement,
but not displace, actual bargains: "The law completes open-ended contracts. There is no
reason why it should be used to impose a term that defeats actual bargains or reduce the
venturers' joint wealth").
12 For example, a shareholder who owns 5% of the stock of a corporation that she
believes is being mismanaged can spend her own money to wage a proxy fight to replace
the board of directors. While she bears the whole cost of waging the proxy fight, she only
receives a 5% share of any increase in value of the corporation brought about by the
change in the composition of the board. More importantly, however, the other sharehold-
ers will receive 95% of the gain even though they did not contribute to the proxy fight.
The gain in corporate value is a collective good to be shared pro rata by all of the share-
holders. As a result, no shareholder has an incentive to incur any expenses to carry out the
proxy fight (unless its pro rata share of the collective good exceeds its cost of waging the
proxy battle). Instead it makes sense to wait and take a free ride on the actions of other
shareholders; the end result is that no shareholder takes any action. See generally MANCUR
OLSON,JR., THE LOGIC OF CoLLE'TIvE AcrION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
(1965).
13 During the last five years, several commentators have formulated an "overregula-
tion" theory to account for the continued apathy of shareholders. These commentators
have focused on the possibility of circumventing this collective action problem now that
large amounts of the equity of large corporations are in the hands of institutional investors
who could feasibly cooperate in the voting process; they have also addressed the continued
reluctance of many institutional investors to become involved in the voting process. See,
e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. RFv. 520 (1990) [herein-
after Black, Shareholder Passivity]; MarkJ. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance,
91 COLUM. L. Rnv. 10 (1991).
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The collapse of the takeover market, the rise of institutional in-
vestor activism, and other changes 14 have recently altered the charac-
ter of the relationship between shareholders and managers. As a
result, it is an opportune time to reevaluate the received theories of
the firm' 5 to account for these changes.' 6
The purpose of this Article is to introduce concepts and para-
digms that have been developed in the game theory literature-par-
ticularly in the theory of bargaining-to refocus the analysis on the
These writers argue that a number of political roadblocks prevent shareholders from
exercising a more powerful voice in shareholder voting. These roadblocks, mostly in the
form of federal and state regulations, have made it difficult for institutional investors to
acquire large equity stakes in companies. Commentators have proposed that regulatory
constraints be relaxed to make it easier for institutional investors to increase the size of
their equity holdings, thereby increasing their participation in the shareholder voting pro-
cess. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voie,
39 UCLA L. REv. 811, 816 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Agents Watching Agents]; Black, Share-
holder Passivity, supra, at 580. I do not discuss the "overregulation" theory in this Article,
since the main concern of that theory has been to identify the legal constraints on share-
holder activism, rather than to set forth a coherent theory of the firm. I deal with the
"overregulation" theory in another article. See Manuel A. Utset, Disciplining Managers:
Shareholder Cooperation in the Shadow of Shareholder Competition, 44 EMORY LJ. 71 (1995).
14 See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
15 My goal, in particular, is to revisit the agency theory of the firm in the hopes of
reexamining some of its assumptions and limitations, which with time and acceptance have
faded into the background. Charles Taylor sets forth the program for such an
undertaking-
If one tries to identify the reasons.., why certain views have to fight for
credence, how they can only acquire plausibility through creative redescrip-
tion while others are so to speak credible from the start, the answer is to be
found in the background of practices ... and the nature of their organizing
principles. These are of course never monolithic; but in a given society at a
given time, the dominant interpretations and practices may be so linked
with a given model that this is, as it were, constantly projected for the mem-
bers as the way things obviously are.... [F]reeing oneself from the model
cannot be donejust by showing an alternative. What we need to do is to get
over the presumption of the unique conceivability of the embedded pic-
ture. But to do this, we have to take a new stance towards our practices.
Instead ofjust living in them and taking their implicit construal of things as
the way things are, we have to understand how they have come to be, how
they came to embed a certain view of things.
Charles Taylor, Philosophy and Its History, in PHiLosopny iN HisToi 17, 21 (Richard Rorty et
al. eds., 1984).
16 For example, in a recent article, Professor Coffee argues that "[a]s the takeover
wave of the 1980s ebbs, a significant shift now appears to be in progress in the way the
public corporation is understood." John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Controk The Institu-
tional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. Ray. 1277, 1278 (1991) [hereinafter Cof-
fee, Liquidity Versus Control]. According to Coffee, the shift is away from the agency theory
of the firm, identified as the "old paradigm," to one that, among other things, "emphasizes
that political forces shaped the modern corporation." Id. at 1278. The other force that has
been identified as contributing to a paradigm shift is the increased concentration of equity
securities in the hands of institutional investors, coupled with an increased interest by
these investors in becoming active in corporate governance. See Dr. Carol Kay Brancato &
Patrick A. Gaugham, Institutional Investors and Capital Markets: 1991 Update (Columbia
Institutional Investor Project, Center for Law & Economic Studies, Columbia University
School of Law, Sept. 1991); Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 13, at 567-72.
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dynamic nature of the shareholder-manager relationship, and, in par-
ticular, to underline the role of the strategic behavior of the parties.
The bargaining paradigm provides a framework for analyzing how the
possibility-and actuality-of cooperation and conflict influence the
way that shareholders and managers act: how they approach
problems, gather information, make decisions, and carry them to
fruition.17
This Article takes the received agency theory of the firm as a stalk-
ing-horse. The goal is not to refute or undermine the received agency
theory, but rather to shake off some of the underlying assumptions
that have restricted the objects to which the theory has attended. The
agency theory of the firm is an offshoot of the more general agency
theory developed in the economic literature.' 8 Like any economic
model, it takes the perfectly legitimate position that its object of analy-
sis is limited in nature: the goal is to capture the essence of certain
interactions, not to mirror reality.
The agency theory of the firm has provided very valuable insights.
In particular, it has set a solid background for the study of how infor-
mational asymmetries affect manager-shareholder relations; of the
role of compensation schemes in aligning managerial incentives with
those of shareholders; and of the role of market, contractual, and reg-
ulatory constraints in shaping the interactions of the parties involved.
Two insights of agency theory are particularly helpful: (1) it does not
make economic sense, in a world of incomplete information, to ex-
pend resources to make managers act in the same exact way that they
17 A more complete analysis of the bargaining context within the firm would include
as players other economic actors in the firm, such as creditors, employees, and board mem-
bers. The bargaining theory in this Article will hopefully provide a model that can eventu-
ally be expanded to include these other constituencies. Some work has already been done
in modelling bargaining by creditors and employees. See MASAHIKO Aoxi, THE CO-OPERA-
TwIE GAME THEORY OF THE FMM (1984) [hereinafter AoKI, CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY]
(bargaining between shareholders and employees with managers as mediators); GARYJ.
MITIER, MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS: THE PoLrrICAL ECONOMY OF HIERARCHY (1992) (bargain-
ing between managers and employees); Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple
Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20J. LEGAL STUD. 311 (1991)
(bargaining in the bankruptcy context); John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate
Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEo. LJ. 1495 (1990) [hereinafter Coffee, Unstable
Coalitions] (shareholder bargaining in the takeover context); Harvey Leibenstein, The Pris-
oners'Dilemma in the Invisible Hand: An Analysis of Intrafirm Productivity, 72 AM. ECON. REv.
92 (Papers & Proceedings, May 1982) (bargaining between employees and managers).
Is A principal attraction of agency theory is its generality. An agency problem can be
deemed to arise any time one individual depends on the actions or behavior of another
individual. SeeJohn W. Pratt & RichardJ. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview, in
PRNCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 1, 2 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985) [hereinafter PINCaPALS AND ACENTS]. Using various assumptions
about the incentives of economic actors and the ways those incentives can be reshaped
through contractual and market constraints, agency theorists have developed sophisticated
theories explaining how individuals in an agency relationship can coordinate their
interactions.
1995]
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would have acted if they had been principals instead of agents; and
(2) market and contractual constraints are frequently cheaper and
more effective than regulatory constraints.
A useful exercise with any economic model is to compare its as-
sumptions with the real world. Although a one-to-one correspon-
dence is not the goal, there are obvious constraints on the liberties
one can take with any model's assumptions. Assumptions that be-
come questionable may be relaxed to see if the model still reaches
similar conclusions. As mentioned above, recent changes have
brought into question the empirical bases for some of the key assump-
tions of the agency theory of the firm. Part of the methodological
difference between the bargaining theory that I propose and the re-
ceived theory arises from a retooling of the underlying assumptions of
the agency theory of the firm.
Specifically, bargaining theory starts with three observations.
First, in contrast to agency theory, bargaining theory holds that the
market and contractual constraints on managerial discretion are not
terribly effective, especially given the collapse of the takeover mar-
ket.19 Unlike managerialist theory, however, bargaining theory does
not conclude that the principal solution to this problem should be
heightened legal intervention. Rather, one goal of bargaining theory
is to better understand market constraints and the way they are
manipulated by managers, in the hopes of eventually making these
constraints more robust through both contractual and legal
provisions.
Second, shareholders, particularly institutional investors, are be-
coming increasingly involved in corporate governance.20 This con-
flicts with both the managerialist view that shareholders do not have
adequate legal protection to become more involved and the agency
theory view that shareholders have no interest in such involvement.
Third, managers use their discretion not only to increase their
compensation packages, but also to increase their bargaining power
in anticipation of future bargaining rounds with shareholders. Their
discretion enables managers to shape the relevant legal and nonlegal
institutions affecting their relationship with shareholders, to change
19 STIGLITZ & EDLIN, supra note 3, at 2-3 ("[I] t is now recognized that neither the take-
over mechanisms nor the shareholder-voting mechanism may exercise effective disci-
pline.... At this point, the theoretical puzzle is not so much how to explain the existence
of managerial discretion, but to explain the existence of managerial discipline."). For a
more detailed critique of the agency theory assumption of market discipline, see infra part
I.
20 See Brancato & Gaugham, supra note 16; Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 13,
at 567-75. Although increased institutional investor activism lends support to the bargain-
ing theory of the firm, I argue in Part II that, even in times of little shareholder activism, it
makes sense to view shareholder-manager relations as an ongoing bargaining game.
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shareholder perceptions and preferences, and to use their control
over the production and distribution of information to gain strategic
advantages. These mechanisms make it more costly for shareholders
to remove managers, who can therefore become more entrenched.
This ongoing preparation for bargaining yields certain costs and inef-
ficiencies that neither managerialist nor agency theory addresses. In
addition, it requires a reconceptualization of our notions of manage-
rial discretion and the ways of controlling it.
This Article places bargaining at the forefront of the picture of
corporate interactions.2 1 While theorists who advocate the received
agency theory of the firm do refer to the relationship between share-
holders and managers as part of a set of implicit and explicit con-
tracts-and thus as the product of some sort of bargain-their
confidence in the efficacy of market and contractual constraints ob-
scures the need for a close examination of the bargaining context.22
For example, William Klein writes that "[t]he theory [he] develop[s]
does not necessarily assume that people engage in bargaining....
[O]ne can think in terms of a bargain (an outcome) rather than bar-
gaining (a process)." 23 This Article begins a closer study of bargaining
among the different actors in the firm, in the hopes of better under-
standing how they interact-how they come into conflict, learn to co-
operate, and calculate the costs and benefits of conflict and
cooperation (including the infrequently examined costs of coopera-
tion and benefits of conflict). I explicitly analyze process in order to
better understand outcomes.
In general, a bargaining context is one in which two or more par-
ties negotiate regarding the possibility of cooperating in some ven-
ture.2 4 The standard bargaining problem is one in which (1) the
parties are in a position to reach an agreement beneficial to both, (2)
conflict exists as to which agreement to reach, and (3) neither party
may unilaterally impose an agreement on another without its
approval.2 5
21 This leads to other methodological differences, such as focusing on: (1) the strate-
gic behavior of managers and shareholders; (2) the bargaining costs produced by such
strategic behavior, (3) the dynamic, ongoing nature of the shareholder-manager relation-
ship; (4) the role of managerial discretion and informational asymmetries in this relation-
ship; and (5) the issue of institutional emergence and change.
22 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel &. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract].
23 William A. Klein, The Modem Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91
YALE LJ. 1521, 1522 (1982).
24 SeeJohn C. Harsanyi, Bargaining in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECO-
NOMICS 190, 190 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter THE NEW PALGRAVE];John F.
Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155, 155 (1950).
25 M.ARTINJ. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBENSrEIN, BARGAINING AND MARKETS 1 (1990).
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The shareholder-manager context satisfies these criteria.26
Shareholders and managers can create a bargaining surplus by coop-
erating with one another, and there are multiple ways of structuring
their interactions to obtain this surplus. Given that different agree-
ments will have different distributional outcomes, there is conflict
about which agreement to reach. Furthermore, since managers and
shareholders always retain the option of exiting the corporation,
neither can impose an agreement without the assent of the other.
A simple example will illustrate some of the issues that can arise
in shareholder-manager relations in a bargaining context. Assume
that C & C, Inc. is a large public corporation.27 State corporation laws
give shareholders little power to run a corporation; this task is re-
served for the board of directors and the managers selected by the
board.28 In a sense, by taking responsibility for the firm's day-to-day
operations, the directors and managers of C & C, Inc. act as agents of
the shareholders. To the extent that managers and shareholders co-
operate in this enterprise (shareholders by providing capital and man-
agers by providing their managerial expertise), both will be better off.
I will adopt the usual assumption that the shareholders of C & C
want to maximize their wealth by maximizing (1) the share price of C
& C stock and (2) distributions by the corporation, such as dividends.
Managers, by contrast, want to maximize (1) the amount of corporate
resources they appropriate for their own use (by means of salaries,
corporate perquisites, and other direct or indirect remuneration) and
(2) the amount of leisure or shirking they enjoy.2 9 Manager and
shareholder goals conflict because an increase in management remu-
neration or leisure will come out of resources that would otherwise
belong to shareholders. Since managers are empowered to make cor-
26 The bargaining game that I have in mind is one in which shareholders and manag-
ers are trying to divide certain substantive and procedural stakes. A bargaining region
exists because managers are not subject to a contract that sets ex ante their exact compensa-
tion and the way they can act. Furthermore, the market constraints that would otherwise
limit a manager's bargaining power are not very effective. See infra notes 49-65 and accom-
panying text.
27 In this Article, I focus on the corporate governance issues that arise in public cor-
porations. Small close corporations, in which bargaining among shareholders and manag-
ers is more common, raise different corporate governance issues that I do not address. For
an overview of these issues, see F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORA-
TIONS (3d ed. 1994); F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 1994).
28 Shareholders elect the members of the board of directors and thus indirectly affect
corporate policy. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141, 211, 214, 216 (1993). In addition,
shareholders must approve a number of other transactions. These include mergers, the
sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the corporation, and the amendment of the
certificate of incorporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242(c), 251(c), 271(a),
275(b) (1993).
29 These are the traditional assumptions in both agency theory and managerialist the-
ory. SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 312-13.
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porate decisions, including how much they will pay themselves, share-
holders must incur costs to monitor and discipline them.30
Next, assume that C & C has suffered financial losses during the
last five years, but the company's managers have continued to give
themselves raises, a scenario that is not too uncommon. What can the
shareholders of C & C do to remedy the situation? What would we
expect them to do? Although questions like these may seem easy to
resolve (for example, shareholders might replace the managers),
these problems have been at the center of the corporate governance
debate ever since Berle and Means.
Both the agency theory of the firm and the bargaining theory
developed in this Article provide answers to these questions. Agency
theory provides answers that may be theoretically sound, but which, in
many areas, provide only broad guidance and prescriptions. Bargain-
ing theory attempts to focus our attention on dynamic and strategic
interaction among the parties. Managerial discretion provides ample
room for strategic maneuvering-in short, for bargaining. Under-
standing these interactions is critical for regulators, for shareholders
deciding whether to use the "exit" or "voice" strategy, and for manag-
ers trying to make a good living while keeping their jobs.
In a sense, while agency theory views shareholdermanager inter-
actions through the naked eye, bargaining theory tries to look at these
interactions through a microscope. Sometimes seeing more is
counterproductive. But as the medical gaze is sometimes undertaken
by the naked eye, it is at other times fixed on the microscope. Know-
ing how to look is of critical importance; knowing that there are dif-
ferent ways of looking at the same phenomena is equally important.
Bargaining theory simply provides a different way to look at share-
holder-manager relations. It does not advocate that you get rid of
your old pairs of glasses; rather, it tries to give you a more finely
ground lens.
Part I discusses the agency theory of the firm in greater depth. It
examines the principal assumptions of the theory and offers an evalu-
ation of the theory, keeping in mind the different contexts in which
the theory is usually deployed. Part II develops a bargaining theory of
30 An economic actor trying to produce certain outputs has two alternatives: she can
act on her own behalf or she can delegate to an agent and incur the costs of monitoring
the agent. The classic example is the division of labor in Adam Smith's pin factory. See
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 5-6
(Edwin Cannan ed., 6th ed. 1950) (1904). Adam Smith also had something to say about
the monitoring problem:
The directors of [joint stock] companies, however, being the managers
rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be ex-
pected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with
which the partners in a private coparmery frequently watch over their own.
Id. at 700.
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the firm. It first sets forth the stakes over which the parties bargain
and then discusses the reasons why shareholders and managers en-
gage in the bargaining process. It concludes by looking at the
mechanics of bargaining. It discusses the nature of the bargaining
interaction and the bargaining asymmetries that one would expect to
arise, and concludes by looking at certain inefficiencies arising from
the bargaining interaction. Part III examines certain applications and
prescriptions suggested by bargaining theory. The final section offers
some conclusions.
I
THE AGENCY THEORY OF THE FiRm
As mentioned above, this Article uses the agency theory of the
firm as a springboard. The goal is not to refute agency theory. In-
stead, this Part offers an account of the principal aspects of the agency
theory of the firm and then offers a critique that aims at identifying
the limits of that theory's applicability. Getting a better understand-
ing of the limitations of the agency theory of the firm will provide
guidance on when we would want to deploy that theory. This analysis
sets the stage for an examination of the bargaining theory of the firm
and the circumstances in which it provides a better explanation than
the agency theory of the firm.
A. An Overview
In the last fifteen years, agency theory has emerged as the domi-
nant theory of the firm among economists3' and legal academics. 32
Before providing agency theory with a technical overlay, we can take
31 See Coffee, Unstable Coalitions, supra note 17, at 1495. For a discussion of the agency
theory of the firm by the principal theorists responsible for its development, seeJensen &
Meckling, supra note 10, at 308-10; Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the
Firm, 88J. POL. ECON. 288, 288-89 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C.Jensen, Separation
of Ownership and Contro4 26J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Michael C.Jensen, Organization Theory
and Methodology, 58 AcCr. REv. 319, 326-32 (1983) [hereinafterJensen, Organization Theory];
Michael C. Jensen & Gerald L. Zimmerman, Management Compensation and the Managerial
Labor Market, 7J. Accr. & ECON. 3, 4-5 (1985).
32 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCGURE, supra note 11, at 9-11; PIUN-
CIpAtS & AGENTS, supra note 18; Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11
GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 99, 108-10 (1989); Klein, supra note 23; Easterbrook & Fischel, The
Corporate Contract, supra note 22, at 1426-28; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE UJ. 698, 700-03 (1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook &
Fischel, Control Transactions]; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel L Fischel, Voting in Corporate
Law, 26J.L. & ECON. 395, 401 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting]; Fama &
Jensen, supra note 31, at 301; Daniel 1. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1261-65 (1982).
Agency theory has not been free from attack, especially among legal academics. Many
of these critiques have come from commentators who believe that the agency paradigm
does not really describe the legal framework under which shareholders and managers in-
teract. See, e.g., Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 8, at 602-07; Coffee, Unstable Co-
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stock. Shareholders hire managers to run the corporation. These
managers can act more effectively if they have a certain degree of dis-
cretion in running the business and if they are not second-guessed
each time they make a decision. Managers will largely control the pro-
duction and dispersion of information regarding their own perform-
ance and that of the business. Shareholders will find it difficult to
overcome the collective action problem in carrying out proxy fights to
remove managers. However, certain market constraints, such as the
market for corporate control and the market for managers, will help
rein in recalcitrant and underperforming managers. Furthermore, ty-
ing managers' compensation to the performance of the firm or mak-
ing them equityholders makes their actions more consistent with the
interest of shareholders.
Agency theory developed in response to neoclassical economic
theory3 3 and managerialist theory34 Rather than viewing the firm as a
neoclassical "black box," agency theory recognizes the conflicting in-
terests of shareholders and managers. The firm of agency theory is no
longer the neoclassical firm in which the only role of managers is to
choose the set of inputs and outputs that maximizes firm profits.
Although managers are still deemed to make production decisions,
agency theory adopts the managerialist assumption that managers are
alitions, supra note 17, at 1495 n.1 (Focusing on agency theory overlooks "the degree to
which other actors can influence or form alliances with the agent.").
33 Neoclassical theory does not focus on the different actors involved in the produc-
tion of goods through the firm. Instead it views the firm as an entity with a coherent
purpose-maximizing profits-subject to certain technological constraints. DAVID M.
KREPs, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIc THEORY 4 (1990). In other words, the firm is envi-
sioned as a "black box" through which inputs are transformed into outputs. The differ-
ence between the cost of producing a good (the input costs) and the revenue from the sale
of such a good will constitute either a profit or loss. SeeJAMES M. HENDERSON & RICHARD E.
QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY:. A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 64 (3d ed. 1980).
Neoclassical theory assumes that production will be coordinated through the market,
management's only task being to choose the amount of inputs and outputs that will maxi-
mize profits. See Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, in OWNERSHIP, CONTROL,
AND CAPrrAL (Harold Demsetz ed., 1988). As Coase pointed out, however, neoclassical
theory fails to take into account that some production is coordinated through firms and
not through the market. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMIc 386, 386-89
(1937). According to Coase, production through the firm is coordinated by an entrepre-
neur (or manager) who directs production by fiat: an "entrepreneur" in a competitive
market system is a person who "take[s] the place of the price mechanism in the direction
of resources." Id. at 388 n.2.
34 Managerialist theory challenges the neoclassical assumption that managers will
strive to maximize shareholder wealth at the expense of maximizing their own wealth. See,
e.g., Robin Marris & Dennis C. Mueller, The Corporation, Competition, and the Invisible Hand,
18 J. ECoN. Lrr. 32, 41 (1980) ("Both the static and growth variants of the managerial
model assume that managers are capable of exercising a claim on a significant share of
firm profits.").
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utility-maximizers who do not always act in the best interests of
shareholders.8 5
Critical to understanding agency theory is understanding the role
played by informational asymmetries in shareholder-manager rela-
tions. Shareholders delegate certain decisionmaking authority to
managers, who are engaged to run the firm.36 In the day-to-day oper-
ation of the firm, managers make decisions on behalf of shareholders.
Two important types of decisions are (1) decisions regarding how
much effort managers will put into managing the company and (2)
decisions regarding investment and operating strategy (decisions that
managers make based on information available only to them and not
to shareholders) . 7 The outcomes of managerial decisions are af-
fected, but not completely determined, by the actions of managers.38
Shareholders are therefore unable to discern whether financial losses
were caused by the self-interested actions of managers or by exoge-
nous factors.3 9 Thus, it is impossible, at zero cost, to ensure that man-
agers act in the same way as the shareholders would act if they were
making the decisions with the same information and capabilities as
the managers.40
Also important to understanding the agency theory of the firm is
understanding the role played by contract. The agency relationship
between shareholders and managers is contractual in nature.41 Like
most contractual relationships, it involves a combination of coopera-
tion and competition (that is, self-interested behavior). The costs in-
curred by both shareholders and managers to close the gap between
35 Because production decisions will be affected by managerial self-interest, they may
not result in outcomes that are optimal from the shareholders' point of view. SeeJensen &
Meckling, supra note 10, at 308.
36 See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a), 142 (1993).
37 We are concerned with two types of asymmetric information: (1) "hidden actions"
by managers-that is, only managers know how much effort they are putting into manag-
ing the company; and (2) "hidden information'"-information about the company that
only managers and not shareholders possess. See KennethJ. Arrow, The Economics ofAgency,
in PRINCIPALS & AGENTS, supra note 18, at 37, 38-42.
38 Technically, the outcome is a random variable whose distribution depends on the
actions taken by the manager. See id. If this were not the case, then the agency problem
could be solved by paying the agent according to the observed outcome, which by defini-
tion would be a function solely of the manager's actions.
39 SeeJoseph E. Stiglitz, Principal and Agent (ii), in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra note 24,
at 966, 967 ("The principal-agent literature focuses on situations where an individual's
actions can neither be observed nor be perfectly inferred on the basis of observable vari-
ables; thus, for instance, it is usually assumed that output is a function of effort and an
unobservable random variable.").
40 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 308; Arrow, supra note 37, at 39.
41 The contract between shareholders and managers is part of the nexus of contracts
of agency theory. See Butler, supra note 32, at 99; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate
Contract, supra note 22, at 1418;Jensen, Organization Theory, supra note 31, at 326;Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 10, at 311; Klein, supra note 28, at 152.
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the way shareholders want managers to act and the way managers do
act are referred to as "agency costs."42 The goal of agency theory is to
explain how certain contractual and market constraints help reduce
agency costs to the optimal level.
Agency theory assumes that, since one or both of the parties (that
is, shareholders and managers) can capture the benefits of reducing
agency costs, they have an incentive to minimize agency costs45 by
adopting certain incentive structures44 and by incurring bonding4 5
and monitoring costs. Agency theory posits that, in the end, an equi-
librium point46 will be reached in which the marginal cost to share-
holders and managers of incurring greater monitoring and bonding
costs equals the marginal gain from reducing the residual loss.47
This equilibrium outcome will be optimal as a second best solu-
tion. In other words, it is not the optimal outcome if we compare it to
a world with complete and costless information that can be completely
processed by the parties. Unlike neoclassical economic theorists,
agency theorists argue that comparing actual outcomes with ideal
world outcomes would be committing the Nirvana fallacy.48
42 If contracts between principals and agents could be written and enforced at no
cost, then such a gap would not exist. However, there are costs at the formation, adminis-
tration, and enforcement stages of the contract, including bonding, monitoring, and
residual costs. See Fama &Jensen, supra note 31, at 304; Smith, supra note 30, at 39.
43 See Pratt & Zeckhauser, supra note 18, at 6; Jensen, Organization Theoy, supra note
31, at 331.
44 One way of closing the gap between managerial and shareholder interests is by
tying managerial compensation to the economic performance of the firm (e.g., paying with
share options, whose value will increase with increases in share value). See Michael C.Jen-
sen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HAuv. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 64-66 [hereinafter
Jensen, Edipse];Jensen & Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 4-6. But see George P. Baker et al.,
Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory, 43 J. FiN. 593, 613-15 (1988) (identifying
barriers that prevent principals and agents from structuring efficient compensation plans
that tie managerial compensation to the firm's economic performance).
45 Managers incur bonding costs to guarantee that they will not take certain actions
and will compensate shareholders if they do. SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 308.
They incur these costs to make it less costly for them to raise capital for the firm, given that
the equity market will anticipate the expected agency costs. Id. at 313.
46 Agency theory responds to the "separation of ownership and control" thesis ad-
vanced by Berle & Means, supra note 2, at 69-118, by positing that market mechanisms will
discipline management until an equilibrium point is reached in their contractual relation-
ship. Agency theory views the contractual relationship between shareholders and manag-
ers as one more akin to a relationship among participants in a market transaction (i.e.,
"the outcome of a complex equilibrium process"), than to one among members of an
economic organization. SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 310-11.
47 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 328. Since shareholders cannot monitor
and enforce managers' actions at zero cost, a point will be reached where expending an
additional dollar in monitoring and enforcement will reduce agency costs by an amount
less than one dollar. At such an equilibrium point, shareholders bear the optimal amount
of monitoring costs and managers the optimal amount of bonding costs. While there will
still be a residual loss, the loss is minimized at the equilibrium point. Id.
48 See Pratt & Zeckhauser, supra note 18, at 3. The separation of ownership and con-
trol produces outcomes that are optimal only as a second-best solution. That is, they are
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B. Assumptions of the Agency Theory of the Firm
This section analyzes three main assumptions of the agency the-
ory of the firm by looking at the role and effectiveness of market, con-
tractual, and evolutionary constraints on managerial discretion.
These constraints have a certain amount of force. How much actual
force is an empirical question that is beyond the scope of this Article.
The goal of this section is to bring into question the robustness of
some of these constraints and to recognize that there is room for ma-
neuvering in how these constraints are identified, measured, and
used. We do not have to prove that these constraints are nonexistent,
but merely that there is room for maneuvering-for strategic behav-
ior-and thus that there is a shortfall in the explanatory power of
agency theory.
1. The Effectiveness of Market Constraints
One assumption of the agency theory of the firm is that managers
minimize agency costs because they are constrained by certain mar-
kets. 49 According to Easterbrook and Fischel, "Managers may do their
best to take advantage of their investors, but they find that the dynam-
ics of the market drive them to act as if they had investors' interests at
heart."50 Let us now look more carefully at these markets and at their
weaknesses as constraining mechanisms. 51
Agency theory relies on the market for corporate control as the
principal market constraint on managerial discretion.5 2 Since the late
optimal only if one compares them to those produced in a non-ideal world, a world where
information is incomplete and costly. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TuRE, supra note 11, at 106 (Nirvana fallacy of comparing imperfect markets against a
mythical perfect judicial or regulatory scheme); Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The
Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analy-
sis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 273 (1986);Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 328.
49 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 328.
50 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 11, at 4. See also
Butler, supra note 32, at 122 ("Market forces constrain managers to act as if they have the
shareholders' interests at heart; which is all that can be expected.").
51 See DONALD A. HAY & DEREKJ. MoRms, INDusrIAL ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATION:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1991); STIGLITZ & EDLIN, supra note 3, at 2-3 (indicating that
the market and shareholder voting constraints on management are so weak that the theo-
retical difficulty lies in explaining discipline rather than discretion); Black, Agents Watching
Agents, supra note 13, at 825-26; Coffee, Liquidity Versus Contro4 supra note 16, at 1279.
52 Robin Marris was the first to introduce the idea of the market for corporate control
as a disciplining mechanism. See ROBIN MARRIs, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF "MANAGERIAL"
CAPITALISM 18-22 (1964); Marris, supra note 6, at 185-91. However, it was Henry Manne
who first saw the market for corporate control as a substantial constraint on managerial
discretion. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control 73J. POL. ECON.
110, 112-14 (1965). During the takeover boom in the 1980s, agency theorists picked up
the concept to support the agency theory of the firm. See, e.g., WilliamJ. Carney, Control-
ling Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model 1988
Wis. L. Ruv. 385; Easterbrook & Fischel, Control Transactions, supra note 32, at 705-08; David
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1980s, 53 however, the market for corporate control has lost most of its
disciplining power.54 In fact, many theorists view the rise of share-
holder activism as a reaction to the demise of the market for corpo-
rate control.55
The market for managers is another market constraint.56 A man-
ager who imposes high agency costs on shareholders would find it
harder to change companies, either voluntarily or after being dis-
missed by the current company.57 One limitation on the proper work-
ings of the market for managers is a problem experienced in any type
of production team (such as a team of managers): it is hard to discern
which manager is underperforming or causing the increase in agency
costs.5 8 Furthermore, the market for managers, just like other labor
markets, is bound to be imperfect. 59 For one thing, if managers can-
D. Haddock et al., Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REv. 701,
727-28, 737-39 (1987); Jensen, Free Cash Flow, supra note 5, at 324-28.
53 Even at the time of highest takeover activity, during the mid to late 1980s, some
theorists questioned the viability of the market for corporate control as a disciplining
mechanism. This is because of free rider problems and managers' use of antitakeover
mechanisms. See HAY & MoRus, supra note 51, at 531.
54 The reasons for the demise of the market for corporate control are many. They
include the following- (1) the collapse of the "junk bond" market; (2) the adoption by
many states of takeover statutes; (3) the improvements in certain antitakeover mechanisms;
and (4) the overall decline in economic performance that led to the bankruptcy of some of
the big companies that had been saddled with large amounts of debt following takeovers
(for example, the Macy and Campeau bankruptcies). See ST-oLrrz & EDUN, supra note 3, at
2; Coffee, Liquidity Versus Contro/, supra note 16, at 1279.
Some theorists, such as Michael Jensen, had gone so far as to proclaim the death of
the public corporation and its replacement by highly leveraged private companies (that is,
those resulting from leveraged buyouts (LBOs)). See, e.g.,Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 44, at
61. For a critique of Jensen's view, see Alfred Rappaport, The Staying Power of the Public
Corporation, HARv. Bus. RE., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 96; Letters to the Editor, The Public Corpora-
tion: Vwwing the Eclips4 HARv. Bus. Rnv., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 182-208 (responding to Jen-
sen). Jensen's theory has lost most of its explanatory power with the collapse of the LBO
market.
55 See Coffee, Liquidity Versus Contro4 suprd note 16, at 1279-80; Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach To Corporate Law, 60 CNN.
L. REv. 347, 347 (1991).
56 The seminal article is Fama, supra note 31.
57 See id. at 292. Many managers will never want to change companies, unless, of
course, they lose their job through a proxy fight or a takeover.
58 For a discussion of the problems that arise in monitoring individual performance
when the individual is part of a team, see Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777, 778-83 (1972); see also
Roy Radner, Team Decision Problems, 33 ANNALS MATHEMATICAL STAT. 857 (1962) (analyzing
how a team of decisionmakers working within a firm, but with differing responsibilities and
information, reaches collective decisions); Roy Radner, Teams, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE,
supra note 24, at 613, 613-16 (summarizing team decisionmaking theory).
59 The imperfection arises in part for the same reason that we have agency problems
in shareholder-manager relations: It is not possible to tell whether a certain outcome is a
product of the manager's effort or some random variable. Furthermore, managers may
acquire company-specific information that makes them "quasi monopolistic suppliers of
managerial skills to the firm." HAY & MoRRs, supra note 51, at 308.
CORAELL LAW REVIEW
not be easily removed from their current jobs, they will not have to
face the discipline of the market unless they so choose. All these fac-
tors limit the efficacy of the market for managers as a constraint on
managerial behavior.60
The market for a company's product is a more indirect constraint
on managers. 6' If a company's managers spend too much time shirk-
ing, divert excess amounts of the net organizational revenues to them-
selves, misinvest free cash flows, or make capital investments for solely
strategic purposes, the company will suffer in the products market.
Whether this market will adequately discipline managers will depend
on the ability of outsiders to pinpoint the cause of a decline in de-
mand for a company's product. If the cause is poor management, we
would want to discipline the managers, but determining fault is diffi-
cult. More importantly, however, managers will have an incentive to
act strategically to ensure that to outside observers it appears that the
downturn was produced by some exogenous factor. The difficulty of
relying on the products market is exacerbated in cases where the com-
pany's product enjoys market power.62
The capital markets also provide some constraints on managerial
discretion.6 3 A firm whose managers impose large agency costs will
find it more difficult to raise capital through the equity markets. Po-
tential shareholders will consider agency costs in valuing the firm and
thus "price protect" themselves by paying less for the shares than they
would for shares of a firm with lower agency costs.64 Thus, raising
capital will become costlier, leaving firms with high agency costs at a
competitive disadvantage. The problem with this constraint is that in
order for it to be effective, managers must continually tap into the
capital markets. However, because managers have discretion to pay
out cash flows (in the form of dividends) or to keep them as retained
earnings, they will do the latter if they want to avoid the disciplining
effect of the capital markets.65
60 Id.
61 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 329-30.
62 See HAY & Moius, supra note 51, at 305, 307; Timothy H. Hannan, Expense-Preferene
Behavior in Banking: A Re-examination, 87J. PoL ECON. 891, 891 (1979). But seeJensen &
Meckling, supra note 10, at 329 ("[F]irm[s] with monopoly power have the same incentives
to limit divergences of the manager from value maximization.").
63 See, e.g., Butler, supra note 32, at 114-15; Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers'Discretion
and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence 9 DELJ. CoRP. L. 540, 556-57 (1984);Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 10, at 329.
64 See Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in
Corporate Governance, 75 IowA L. REv. 1, 14 (1989); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at
306, 351.
65 In fact, this is the argument behind Michael Jensen's free cash flow theory. How-
ever, Jensen assumes that other market constraints, such as the market for corporate con-
trol, will lead managers to pay out funds, either as dividends, or, more likely, in the form of
interest payments to debtholders. SeeJensen, Free Cash Flow, supra note 5, at 323-24.
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2. The Effectiveness of Contractual Constraints
Even if market constraints are not very effective, contractual ar-
rangements can also limit managerial discretion. This section exam-
ines the role of contracts and governance structures in defining the
relationship between shareholders and managers, and sets forth the
limitations of agency theory's use of the contractual-governance
paradigm. 66
Contracts are useful for ordering relationships only to the extent
that they are not systematically breached. Contracts enforced by third
parties, such as governments (which have authority) or bat-wielding
independent contractors (which merely have power),67 or which are
somehow self-enforcing, 68 are of this sort. Whether contracts are en-
forced by third parties or are self-enforcing depends to a large degree
on whether the contracts are explicit or implicit.69 In describing
shareholder-manager contracts, I will refer to contracts enforced by
third parties as explicit contracts and self-enforcing contracts as im-
plicit contracts.7 0
66 A number of legal academics-particularly those who reject the economic ap-
proach-have questioned the contractual approach. See Brudney, Corporate Governance,
supra note 8; Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS,
supra note 18, at 55; John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the
Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919 (1988). For a defense of
the contractarian view, see Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary
Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); Easterbrook & Fis-
chel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 22; Jensen & Meclding, supra note 10, at 310-11.
67 See generaly AUTHORT" (Joseph Raz ed., 1990) (containing several views concerning
the concept of authority in ethics and political philosophy).
68 Contracts can be self-enforcing in numerous ways, but for our purposes three pos-
sibilities are relevant: (1) the parties can be constrained by market mechanisms; (2) the
parties can be repeat players; and (3) the parties can possess certain internalized norms.
See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUrrONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE 12-15, 55-56 (1990).
69 By explicit contracts I mean contracts with terms that are agreed to ahead of time
and which are specific enough to be enforced by third parties. By implicit contracts, I
mean every other type of relationship that can be described as contractual, from expressed
contracts where, given future uncertainties, the terms are not very well defined (that is,
incomplete contracts and relational contracts) to implied "contracts" arising out of the
parties' behavior. Taken to the extreme, "implicit contract" can refer to any voluntary
arrangement, as opposed to one required by law. See EASTERBROOK & FiscHEL, THE ECO-
NOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 11, at 14 ("To say that a complex relation among many vol-
untary participants is adaptive is to say that it is contractual.... Voluntary arrangements
are contracts."). Conceiving of every voluntary relationship as a contract diminishes most
of the explanatory power of the concept. SeeErich Schanze, Contract, Agency, and the Delega-
tion of De ison Making, in AGENCY THEORY, INFORMATION, AND INCENTFS 461, 464 (Gunter
Bamberg & Klaus Spremann eds., 1989).
70 Of course, one can still conceive of implicit contracts that are enforced by third
parties (e.g., relational contracts). Relational contracts do not usually end up in court,
however, because parties usually find it cheaper to rely on other forms of enforcement (or
accommodation). See OLvE E. WILAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTrrUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
166 (1985) ("Extensive recourse to private ordering is hardly a paradox if the limits of
contract and of the courts are recognized .... Inasmuch, moreover, as the benefits of
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As a general rule, explicit contracts will be more difficult to
breach, and, thus, will provide greater constraints on discretion than
will implicit contracts. Explicit contracts, however, are not always
available. When parties to a contract-such as shareholders and man-
agers-are involved in a long term relationship, future uncertainties
and other informational problems make it impossible to provide for
all contingencies in the contract 7 1 Given the nature of entrepreneur-
ship and the changing conditions in capital and products markets, it is
impossible (and undesirable) to provide for every future contingency
in an explicit and complete contract governing the shareholder-man-
ager relationship. 72 This means that shareholders and managers rely
on implicit contracts which are self-enforcing at best. The contracts
'continuing harmonious relations' . . . apply to organizations of all kinds, while the limits
of courts for dealing with complex problems are everywhere severe, greater attention to
the ways by which conflict is mitigated ex ante and to the range of formal and informal
devices by which disputes are settled ex post is needed."); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business, 28 AMER. Soc. Rav. 55, 61 (1963). Easterbrook and Fischel argue that
corporate law provides a set of "off-the-rack" terms to the implicit contract between share-
holders and managers, some of which, such as fiduciary duties, are enforced through third-
party mechanisms. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUcaruRE, supra note 11, at
34.
71 These agency contracts can be characterized as long-term relational contracts. See
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L REv. 1089,
1091 (1981); Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL L. REv. 691, 720
(1974). Doing so does not help very much, however, because it merely points out that
managers and shareholders are involved in a long term relationship. Unlike relational
contracts in commercial transactions, in most cases these agency contracts are implicit con-
tracts that are not enforceable in the same way as traditional contracts under contract law.
The explicit contract set forth in the corporate charter does not provide for much more
than the amount and type of shares issued and the name and addresses of the corporation,
the incorporators, and the agent for service of process. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102
(1993). Although charters can provide more information, they do so only rarely, if ever.
Id.
Klein argues that one way to solve some of the problems of the agency paradigm is to
establish long term contracts between managers and shareholders. Klein, supra note 23, at
1525. He readily admits, however, that such contracts have many limitations, including the
difficulty in preventing managers from leaving the corporation and the fact that long term
contracts exacerbate the moral hazard problem. Id. at 1546-48 n.91.
Falling back on the default rules that corporate law provides to fill the gaps in this
"contract" is not very helpful because the law merely sets certain parameters to define the
bargaining context. For example, corporate law can be seen as setting certain broad limi-
tations on the bargaining power of shareholders and managers. Part Il of this Article
analyzes this function of the law in more depth.
72 See WILtUAMSON, supra note 70, at 29 ("Transaction cost economics maintains that it
is impossible to concentrate all of the relevant bargaining action at the ex ante contracting
stage"; this is due to the fact that human actors have bounded rationality and are opportu-
nistic, and to the nature of complex transactions.); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate
Contract, supra note 22, at 34 (arguing that the main role of corporate law is to fill in the
gaps in corporate contracts that are the product of the parties' oversight and noting the
fact that it is not costless for them to transact).
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between shareholders and managers are usually understood as agency
contracts73 or governance structures.74
These agency contracts are self-enforcing, according to agency
theorists, because the parties-especially managers-are subject to
market constraints. Managers who refuse to comply with "the rules of
the game" will suffer the consequences: they will not be able to avoid
scrutiny because they are repeat players; they will find it difficult to
raise capital in the capital markets; their worth in the market for man-
agers will diminish; they will be weeded out through takeovers or
proxy fights; and their companies will not survive, but will instead be
weeded out by that ultimate weed-whacker-evolution. In the prior
subsection, I showed that these market constraints are not very effec-
tive. 75 Therefore, relying on market constraints to bolster the viability
of implicit agency contracts does not ensure that these contracts will
greatly constrain managers.
However, all is not lost. The bargaining theory of the firm helps
us focus on the emergence and viability of other informal rules and
norms that can help shape shareholder-manager relations. Agency
theorists, by focusing on "contracts" and "market constraints"7 6 and
assuming that these lead to the optimal results, fail to ask many impor-
tant questions. What happens when there are changes in the effec-
tiveness of different markets? What other informal rules or
institutions help constrain managers? How can managers, through
their actions, affect the viability of these market constraints and other
informal constraints? How do governance structures emerge and
change when the "invisible hand" is not the only hand in sight? Bar-
gaining theory helps us answer these questions. 77
73 Cf. Jensen & Meckling, supi-a note 10, at 311 (The private corporation or firm
serves as "a nexus for contracting relationships.").
74 SeeWILLIAMSON, supra note 70, at 305 (Shareholders can protect their investment in
the firm by adopting governance structures that will "safeguard against expropriation and
egregious mismanagement."); Easterbrook & Fischel, 77w Corporate Contrac supra note 22,
at 1420 ("The first question facing entrepreneurs is what promises to make, and the sec-
ond is how to induce investors to believe the promises.").
75 The next section deals with the weaknesses of the evolutionary argument. See infa
notes 78-103 and accompanying text.
76 It is not by accident that agency theorists focus on "contracts" and "market con-
straints." As explained earlier, the agency theory of the firm developed as a reaction to
managerialist theory's claim that managers have virtually unfettered discretion which can
only be constrained through legal intervention. Agency theorists want to encourage pri-
vate ordering to the extent that it is viable. Private ordering, if there are sufficient "market
constraints," will produce better results than legal intervention. Therefore, one goal of
agency theory is to show that these market constraints are robust. Why the term "con-
tract"? Contract implies consent, which implies legitimacy. See Schanze, supra note 69, at
468. Thus, Easterbrook and Fischel say that "[v]oluntary arrangements are contracts."
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRuruRE, supra note 11, at 14.
77 More importantly, the theory does not by its assumptions foreclose us from asking
these questions.
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3. Natural Selection and Efficiency
Jensen and Meckling's original exposition of the agency theory of
the firm presented a static analysis.78 The relationship between share-
holders and managers, however, is dynamic. 79 Shareholders and man-
agers interact in different contexts and over a relatively long period of
time; they must adapt to changed circumstances, unforeseen contin-
gencies, and changes in the relative bargaining power of the parties.80
Easterbrook and Fischel recognize the dynamic nature of the re-
lationship8' and provide a theory of how governance structures
(agency contracts) evolve over time through natural selection.8 2 They
argue that competition eliminates practices and institutions that do
not assist shareholders.83 The effects of institutions that have survived
for long periods can be more easily gauged by shareholders and man-
agers than by regulators or academics, making the institutions less sus-
ceptible to the challenge that there was a "mistake" in the assessment
of their costs and benefits (that is, that they are not the optimal insti-
tutions).84 Thus, they conclude that institutions that survive are effi-
cient institutions.8 5
78 Jensen and Meckling acknowledge that such a static analysis, which they adopted to
analyze the equilibrium market outcome of manager-shareholder contracts, fails to take
into account the multi-period aspects of shareholder-manager relations. See Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 10, at 351-52.
79 The implicit and explicit contracts between managers and shareholders are highly
malleable and subject to negotiation and interpretation. Furthermore, shifts in relative
bargaining power between shareholders and managers occur frequently because of
changes in industry competition and shareholder concentration. On the structure of
shareholdings, see Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership:
Causes and Consequences, 93J. PotL ECON. 1155 (1985).
80 In a sense, managers and shareholders interact from the time the corporation is
formed until it is dissolved. Even though the individual shareholders and managers may
change, not all shareholders can exit the corporation at the same time. E.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 151(b) (1993) (a corporation is required to have at least one common share-
holder, since it must at all times have outstanding at least one class of stock with full voting
rights that is not subject to redemption); id. §§ 141(a), 142 (a corporation shall be man-
aged by or under the direction of the board of directors, which may in turn delegate some
of its responsibilities to managers).
81 See EAsTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRuCrTURE, supra note 11, at 14; see also
Fama &Jensen, supra note 31, at 301 ("Our goal is to explain the survival or organizations
characterized by separation of 'ownership' and 'control.'").
82 According to Easterbrook and Fischel, mandatory provisions prescribed by law are
undesirable because they halt this evolutionary process. See EAsmRBROOK & FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRucruRE, supra note 11, at 31.
83 Id. at 13. They cite Alfred Chandler and Oliver Williamson for the argument that
"those who do not adapt their corporate governance structure are ground down by compe-
tition." Id. at 13 (citing ALFMRD D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND (1977); WILIAMSON,
supra note 70).
84 See id. at 31.
85 For a critique of this view, see Victor Goldberg, Relational Exchange: Economics and
Complex Contracts, 23 Am. BEHAvioRAL SciENisr 337, 342 (1980) (the view that "[w]hatever
is, is right" is incorrect because "[e]fficiency is contextual. Given the social context, the
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In essence, agency theorists respond to Berle and Means with a
simple riposte: separation of ownership and control is the economi-
cally optimal way of organizing the corporation; otherwise, the corpo-
ration would not have survived. This argument implies that the
formal and informal institutions of corporate governance that have
arisen, including the institutions of exit, legal constraints such as fidu-
ciary duties, and implicit and explicit contracts between managers and
shareholders, are economically optimal. According to agency theory,
the interactions giving rise to these institutions are economically opti-
mal either because they result from voluntary agreements between
shareholders and managers86 or because they are the product of com-
petition in a market for institutions in which only optimal institutions
survive. 87 But it is not at all clear that the latter claim is correct. In
fact, many other factors affect the survival of institutions.
In analyzing the agency theorists' confidence in the natural selec-
tion mechanism, I will focus on three issues: the strength of the com-
petitive process, the time frame involved, and the baseline used. As
already discussed in the prior two subsections, market and contractual
constraints are not as strong as agency theorists would lead us to be-
lieve. Where competitive forces are weak and the discretion of parties
is broad, the evolutionary explanation loses a lot of its power.
Even if we were to assume that competitive forces are robust, we
need to look at the time frame that the agency theory assumes.88 A
theory that tells us that governance structures will eventually evolve
into the optimal institutions8 9 does not provide much guidance to par-
ties-shareholders, managers, lawyers, courts, investment bankers,
and others involved in current transactions.
A critical move made by agency theorists is in the baseline that
they adopt. Neoclassical theory starts with the assumption of perfect
information.90 Agency theory, with its focus on informational
problems, rejects using that baseline. Using the neoclassical baseline,
according to such theorists, would entail the Nirvana fallacy.91 So
agency theorists adopt a "second best" approach, rejecting the world
parties will attempt to arrange their affairs as best they can. If the context were different,
then the efficient structure would also differ.")
86 SeeJAcK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SocIAL CoNFLicr 110 (1992).
87 See KNIGHT, supra note 86, at 115-16; NORTH, supra note 68, at 83-84.
88 SeJOHN MAYNARD KE'N s, A TRAcr ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923) ("[T]his long
run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists
set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us
that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again.") (emphasis omitted).
89 "Firms and teams of managers can compete with each other over the decades to
design governance structures .... " EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, THE EcoNoMIc STRuarutE,
supra note 11, at 7.
90 See KREPs, supra note 83, at 264.
91 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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of perfect information as unreachable and irrelevant. 92 Rejecting the
perfect information baseline, however, does not automatically give
rise to a commonly acceptable and verifiable baseline.93
How does one compare second-best alternatives? Agency theo-
rists tell us that the baseline is "survivability": those institutions that
survive are the optimal ones.94 The justification for using such a base-
line is not very strong because the set of "surviving" institutions is itself
always changing and evolving, and because there are many variables
other than efficiency that determine which institutions survive.
We can better understand the limitations of the survivability base-
line by looking more carefully at the nature of institutional change.
Examining the effect of institutional change95 is necessary even if we
begin with socially optimal institutions. Over time, the context in
which these institutions operate will change, and formerly optimal in-
stitutions will lose their optimality.96 It is usually assumed that new
optimal institutions emerge, either through consensual agreements or
through the process of natural selection.97 However, there are a
92 Agency theorists cannot completely abandon the concept of perfect information or
else they would not be able to account for shareholders' ability to determine the magni-
tude of residual losses associated with agency costs. Sea Dieter Schneider, Agency Costs and
Transaction Costs: Flops in the Principal-Agent-Theory of Financial Markets, in AGENCY THEORY,
INFORMATION, AND INCENTIVES, supra note 69, at 481, 483.
93 See Klaus Spremann, Agent and Principa in AGENCY THEORY, INFORMATION, AND IN-
cENTIvEs, supra note 69, at 3, 8 (Given the malleability of the definition of agency costs, one
must "be very careful when using agency costs to compare and evaluate alternative second-
best arrangements.").
94 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTUtRE, supra note 11, at 13 ("The
history of corporations has been that firms failing to adapt their governance structures are
ground under by competition.") (citations omitted); Fama &Jensen, supra note 31, at 301
("Absent fiat, the form of organization that survives in an activity is the one that delivers
the product demanded by the customers at the lowest price while covering costs.") (cita-
tion omitted).
95 Transaction cost theory shows a better understanding of the role of institutional
change than does agency theory. See NORTH, supra note 68, at 27-35; WxLLIAMSON, supra
note 70, at 20-23.
96 Douglass North provides certain examples of changes in relative prices that would
provide the basis for adopting new and more efficient institutions or contracts. These
include changes in the ratio of factor prices, the cost of information, and technology. See
NORTH, supra note 68, at 67. Transaction cost theorists, including North, assume that insti-
tutional change will occur if the benefits obtained by the parties outweigh the transaction
costs (the cost of changing the current institutions or contracts). Id. at 67; see also WitaAm-
SON, supra note 70, at 1 (indicating that the main purpose of the economic institutions of
capitalism is to economize on transaction costs). The institutional change may also occur
due to competitive market forces (i.e., through natural selection). Armen A. Alchian, Un-
certainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, 58J. POL ECON. 211, 213 (1950).
97 See NORTH, supra note 68, at 83-84; WIUtaAMSON, supra note 70, at 2 (Economic
institutions of capitalism are "numerous, subtle and continuously evolving"; transaction
cost analysis focuses on "the comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task
completion under alternative governance structures.") (italics omitted); Fama & Jensen,
supra note 31, at 301 (examining the survivability of firms that separate ownership and
control).
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number of reasons why this may not occur: there may be certain hid-
den benefits to stasis;98 attempts to change institutions may be re-
stricted by the interests and actions of third parties, such as the state;99
the parties may lack the knowledge or ability to change the institu-
tions because of uncertainty'"° and bounded rationality;1 1 natural se-
lection based on competitive forces may simply not provide a useful
paradigm for institutional change;102 and given the nature of share-
holder-manager relationships, the existence of power asymmetries be-
tween the parties may lead to institutions or contracts that are not
socially optimal. 10 3
98 In other words, institutional rules which at first blush appear to create higher costs
may in fact lead to more efficient exchanges. See KNlcar, supra note 86, at 112; see also Ian
Ayres & Robert Germer, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YAIE LJ. 87 (1989) (Penalty default rules may lead to more efficient outcomes by
requiring that a party with an informational advantage reveal information to the other
party.).
99 See KNIGHT, supra note 86, at 112; NORTH, supra note 68, at 86-87.
100 See KENN~mJ. ARRow, THE Limrrs OF ORGANIZATION 55 (1974) (Organizations and
their members will make investments by setting up information channels and acquiring
skills in information processing and injob-specific areas; these investments involve irrevers-
ible capital expenditures.); KIGHT, supra note 86, at 112; RICHARD R. NELSON & SYDNEY G.
WINTER, AN EvoLurIoNARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 76-78 (1982) (discussing prob-
lem of tacit knowledge and how it affects the transfer of information within organizations,
especially information required to "teach" skills to other organizational members).
101 See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR xxiv (1961) (organizational actors
modeled as being "intendedly rational, but only limitediy so") (emphasis omitted); WIL-
LIAMSON, supra note 70, at 45-47.
102 Jack Knight argues that focusing on competitive market forces as the selection
mechanism that will lead to the emergence of optimal institutions does not make much
sense given that "[i]nstitutions are not goods." KNIGHT, supra note 86, at 116 (emphasis
omitted). While almost anything may be deemed a "good" by economists, "institutions are
not tangible, substantive goods." Id. This has the following three effects. First, institutions
govern and structure the interactions between individuals: thus they "attach to people in
ways that substantive goods do not.... As long as [particular individuals] remain part of
the interaction, [they] remain governed by the rule." Id. at 117. The effect is that institu-
tions are not alienable like goods and the party-specific nature of institutions limits the
number of competitors. Id. Second, because interactions based on institutional rules are
not always interchangeable, the identity of the actors may be relevant to the transactions.
This may limit the range of alternative transactions. Id. Third, the set of possible rules on
which institutions can be based is small. The rules, therefore, can be deemed to be "lumpy
and coarse-grained" instead of easily fungible. Id.; see also Mark Granovetter, Economic Ac-
tion and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMIC LIFE
53 (Mark Granovetter & Richard Swedberg eds., 1992) (discussing institutional
embeddedness).
103 This is because power asymmetry prompts the party with superior bargaining power
to use that power to guarantee itself a larger slice of the pie, even if it means having a
smaller pie to slice (i.e., not adopting the socially optimal institution or contract). See
KNIGHT, supra note 86, at 33-34. Agency theory, as well as transaction cost theory, has
relied on the existence of competitive markets in arguing that power asymmetries do not
play a large role in shareholder-manager interactions. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems
and the Theory of the Firm, 88J. POL ECON. 288, 290-91 (180) (constraint from the market for
managers);Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 828-29 (constraint from market for man-
agers and the capital markets); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the MarkA for Corporate Control,
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C. Evaluating the Agency Theory of the Firm
One can evaluate a theory by the guidance that it provides those
who turn to it for counsel. In the case of a theory of the firm, likely
repeat customers will be shareholders; managers and directors; other
constituencies, such as debtholders and employees; lawyers, account-
ants, and investment bankers who advise firms; and regulators trying
to decide what policies to adopt and how to implement those already
adopted. No one theory can satisfy this whole coterie.
For example, there are three basic questions that shareholders of
a large public corporation would want answered: (1) How much dis-
cretion should managers have?; (2) How do we know which managers
are the best for the job?; and (3) What should be done about un-
derperforming managers (those who diverge too much from maximiz-
ing shareholder wealth)?
Managers and directors want some guidance on how they should
act and a sense of how much they can diverge from maximizing share-
holder wealth before they bear the consequences (that is, before the
gain from so doing is less than the penalty handed out by the share-
holders, regulators, or any other party).
Debtholders and employees want to know how to protect their
interests and want some guidance on how managers and shareholders
are expected to act in situations where manager and/or shareholder
interests conflict with theirs. Lawyers, accountants, and investment
bankers want information regarding the incentives of the parties in-
volved and information that will allow them to address legal, account-
ing, and valuation issues. Regulators want to know what policies to
adopt and how to carry them out.
The agency theory of the firm provides some guidance to these
parties. In particular, as agency theory would suggest, shareholders
understand that certain agency costs are unavoidable, that a certain
amount of managerial discretion will further their interests, and that
managers are subject to certain market and contractual constraints.
While this provides some broad guidance, shareholders may want to
know what happens when these market and contractual constraints
lose some or all of their effectiveness.
73J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965) (market for corporate control). On the role of competition in
undermining bargaining power, see John Kennan & Robert Wilson, Bargaining with Private
Information, 31 J. ECON. Lrr. 45, 47 n.7 (1993) (some degree of bilateral monopoly is
needed to have a bargaining context); see also TIBoR Scrrovsiv, WELFARE AND COMPETITON
14 (1971) ("The main curb on a person's bargaining power, and the main pacifying influ-
ence on trade in general, is competition. A person has competition if the party he wants to
trade with has alternative opportunities of exchange.... Competition restricts a person's
bargaining power by making the other party less dependent and therefore less keen on
striking a bargain with him.").
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D. Drawing Boundaries on the Agency Theory of the Firm
If we relax the assumptions of effective market and contractual
constraints and of the optimality of existing institutions, we then need
to address the following four issues: (1) the degree of managerial dis-
cretion in large public firms, (2) the effect of the rise of greater share-
holder activism, (3) the willingness of managers to take actions that
will benefit shareholders but hurt managers, and (4) the ability of
managers and shareholders to come to an understanding that will
benefit both sides.10 4
1. Managerial Discretion and the 'Trankenstein Effect"
Joseph Stiglitz and Aaron Edlin have recently argued that, given
the weaknesses of market constraints, "the theoretical puzzle is not so
much how to explain the existence of managerial discretion, but to
explain the existence of managerial discipline." 10 5 The level of mana-
gerial discretion is important because it affects both present and fu-
ture interactions between shareholders and managers. For example,
managers can use this discretion to compensate themselves more than
they would if market constraints were robust.
More importantly, however, managers will use this discretion to
put themselves in a better strategic position for future interactions
with shareholders. For example, they will take actions that will help
them become entrenched or that will affect the amount and accuracy
of information available to shareholders in future periods. Managers
may also expend company resources to try to change shareholder
preferences. Annual reports, proxy statements, and shareholder rela-
tions departments are all "legitimate" ways of changing shareholder
preferences.'06 The important point is that managerial discretion will
be used not only to take away resources from shareholders in the pres-
ent period, but also to enhance managerial discretion in future
periods.
An assumption of the agency theory of the firm is that the princi-
pals (the shareholders) will have the power to in some way discipline
104 These last two are treated together because they are interrelated.
105 STiGLrrZ & EDUN, sup ra note 3, at 3. Stiglitz and Edlin go on to state that "[r] ecent
thinking has thus returned to the position of earlier managerial literature which simply
took the existence of managerial discretion as an obvious fact and focused on what objec-
tives the managers did in fact pursue." Id. at 4. They then indicate that their paper "is a
continuation of that tradition." Id. at 5. These comments are significant because they are
made by economists who have played an important role in developing agency theory.
106 See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955)
(holding that directors may make expenditures from the corporate treasury to influence
shareholder preferences during a policy contest).
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their agents (the managers). 07 Unlike pure market relationships, in
which none of the actors involved have market power, agency relation-
ships are hierarchical relationships in which principals and agents in-
teract as superiors and subordinates rather than as coequal actors. 08
Thus, in the agency description of the corporation one sees what
can be called a "Frankenstein effect": the principals have created the
agency relationship, but they have lost most of their ability to disci-
pline their agents and terminate the relationship (other than by sell-
ing their shares, which shareholders as a group cannot all do).109
Agency theory does not account for the hierarchical reversal"10
implicit in the Frankenstein effect. In such instances, the relationship
between shareholders and managers begins to lose its resemblance to
such paradigmatic agency relationships as employer-employee, land-
lord-tenant, and lender-borrower."' For example, in these paradig-
matic agency relationships, it is usually the case that before the agent
chooses among possible actions, there is already a contract that speci-
fies the rule for determining the agent's compensation. 112 The issue
that arises for principals in these relationships is how to structure
these contracts to induce the agents to act in the principals' inter-
est.1 lS Furthermore, the principals are in a position to design and
impose on their agents a contract with optimal incentive
mechanisms."14
107 One can view the agency relationship as a way in which one party, the principal,
can "attain and maintain control in order to carry out definite, yet varying purposes." Har-
rison C. White, Agency as Contro4 in PRINCIPALS & AGENTS, supra note 18, at 187, 188.
108 See Louis Pu'rrEmAN, THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FiRM 6 (1986).
109 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (b) (1993); see also WILLtAMSON, supra note 70,
at 304-05 (Shareholders as a group are the only constituency of the corporation "whose
relation with [it] does not come up for periodic renewal."). Agency theory once again falls
back on the other market mechanisms for disciplining. But if these market mechanisms
are weak then one needs to explain the effect of these power asymmetries on the relation-
ship of managers and shareholders.
110 Karl Llewellyn in 1930 alluded to such hierarchical reversals in agency
relationships:
Finally, with growing specialization, agency takes on another aspect... the
specialized... purveyor.. . moves largely out of control of his principal,
becomes an independent unit and may gather sufficient financial power to
finance and even control his scattered "principals".... In all such cases of
independence of the "agent" the tendency is strong for the one-time
agency to be swallowed up in contract, as between two independent dealers.
Karl N. Llewellyn, Agency, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 483 (1930), quoted in
White, supra note 107, at 188.
III Fama & Jensen, supra note 31, at 808 (separation of roles for managers (initiation
and implementation of decisions) and of shareholders who are the risk bearers (ratifica-
tion of decisions and monitoring of managers)); Stiglitz, supra note 39, at 241.
112 See Arrow, supra note 37, at 37. The fee will depend on the outcome of the agent's
actions, as observed by the principal. Id.
113 See Pratt & Zeckhauser, supra note 18, at 2.
114 See Pratt & Zeckhauser, supra note 18, at 16. Pratt and Zeckhauser admit that this
assumption is rarely met in the real world, although they believe that it does not signifi-
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As seen above, manager-shareholder contracts differ significantly
from the stylized contracts of agency theory. They are usually implicit
contracts that do not clearly establish a compensation scheme for
managers ex ante." 5 Furthermore, the managers and the board of di-
rectors determine the nature and content of these contracts." 6 This
gives managers certain leeway to engage in strategic behavior.
2. The Changing Role of Shareholders in Corporate Governance
Over the last few years, commentators have given increasing at-
tention to the role of shareholders in corporate governance."17 This
new interest has been spurred by the heightened activism of institu-
tional investors. The last decade has seen a great shift in the composi-
tion of shareholdings. The Berle and Means corporation, with its
thousands of dispersed shareholders, has given way to corporations
with shareholdings highly concentrated in the hands of institutional
investors. As of the end of 1990, over fifty percent of the equity of
public corporations was held by institutional shareholders such as
public pension funds, mutual funds, bank trust departments, and pri-
vate pension funds." 8 Recently, large institutional investors have be-
gun to reinterpret their role in monitoring and disciplining managers
and have increasingly challenged managerial autonomy.
candy affect the explanatory power of agency theory. Id. Benjamin Hermalin, writing
about the manager-shareholder agency contract, however, argues that this assumption
should be reversed so that it is assumed that it is managers who impose the contract on the
principals. See Benjamin E. Hermalin, The Effects of Competition on Executive Behavior, 23
RANDJ. ECON. 350, 351 (1992).
115 See Arrow, supra note 37, at 49 ("compensation schemes for corporate executives
... have a large discretionary component"). In fact, managers and the board of directors
decide on the compensation scheme at the end of the relevant period. While there may be
express compensation contracts in place, such contracts generally leave much discretion
for ex post determination of compensation. Id.
116 In other words, the agents design and impose these contracts on the principals,
rather than the principals dictating the terms to the agents. See Hermalin, supra note 114,
at 351. This role reversal is generally explained as a function of the collective action prob-
lem in shareholder voting. See supra note 12.
117 See infra part II.C.2.a.
118 See Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 13, at 827. The potential for greater
shareholder involvement in corporate governance has increased dramatically. Previously,
it was inconceivable that shareholders would have considerable bargaining power other
than their ability to sell their shares. But the increase in institutional shareholdings brings
the bargaining issue into the forefront. As the collective action problem begins to fade, it
makes more sense to model the relationship between shareholders and managers as a bar-
gaining game. The key to greater shareholder activism does not lie solely in the ability of
shareholders to overcome the collective action problem and certain conflicts of interest
faced by money managers. Even if they overcome these two problems, shareholders will
have to deal with the fact that they find themselves in a bargaining context in which exit
may still prove to be the dominant strategy. Agency theorists writing on the issue of share-
holder voting have assumed that it is efficient for shareholders to remain passive, given the
existence of other market constraints and the fact that voting is expensive and unlikely to
provide high returns. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting, supra note 32, at 402-03.
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There are two principal reasons for increased shareholder activ-
ism: the increased shareholdings by large institutional investors 19
and the growing inefficiencies of the markets for corporate control
and managers. 120 In particular, some commentators have explained
the rise of shareholder activism as a reaction to the demise of the
market for corporate control. 121
The agency theory of the firm has usually started with the as-
sumption that shareholders have small holdings and are atomistic.
Easterbrook and Fischel have argued that, given the collective action
problems in shareholder voting, one should not assume that share-
holders want to be more involved and want more information; these
two assumptions, they claim, "are not supported by evidence." 22
They conclude that shareholders would want to limit the scope of
their voting rights and the amount of information that managers are
required to supply to them because shareholders are rationally apa-
thetic and are conscious of the cost of producing and disclosing infor-
mation that they will not want to use in the first place.'23
This view, of course, cannot explain the rise of shareholder activ-
ism. As shareholders move from being rationally apathetic' 24 to being
more involved in corporate governance, we must modify the theory of
the firm to account for this change. The relationships among share-
holders and between shareholders and managers will give rise to new
forms of strategic behavior for which our theory must account.
3. The Role of Distributional Conflict
The main weakness of the agency theory of the firm is its failure
to fully account for the distributional conflict between shareholders
and managers. 125 This is due to agency theorists' assumption that
119 Several large public pension funds, such as the California Public Employees Retire-
ment System (CalPERS) and the New York Public Employee Pension Fund, have taken the
lead. More recently, private pension funds, such as the Campbell Soup pension fund, have
become more involved. SeeSusan Pulliam, CampbeU Soup Fund to TakeActivist Rol, WALL ST.
J., July 15, 1993, at C1.
120 See Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control supra note 16, at 1279; Gordon, supra note 55, at
347.
121 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 55, at 347.
122 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUcTURE, supra note 11, at 82-83. They
go on to say that the disparity between the rhetoric of shareholder democracy and share-
holder conduct shows that these assumptions do not hold. Id. at 83.
123 Id. at 83.
124 Or at best rationally peripatetic (that is, rational shareholders, via the "Wall Street
Rule," can also sell their shares when they are dissatisfied with management).
125 Agency theory starts with the premise that shareholders and managers have differ-
ent interests and that it is precisely managers' attempt to maximize their selfish interests
that leads to agency costs. However, the agency costs that agency theory describes are quite
limited, especially from a bargaining standpoint, because they do not include strategic
bargaining costs. In particular, agency theory unduly minimizes the distributional inten-
tions of managers. For example, managers are seen as having an incentive to incur bond-
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shareholders and managers have an incentive to minimize agency
costs.' 26 This, in turn, allows agency theorists to conclude that share-
holders and managers will actually reach an equilibrium contract ac-
cording to which shareholders incur the optimal amount of
monitoring costs and managers bear the optimal amount of bonding
Cots.'2
2 7
As this Article notes in the next Part, characterizing the relation
between shareholders and managers as an ongoing bargaining game
allows us to focus on the distributional conflict between them. In the
bargaining theory of the firm, managers and shareholders engage in a
bargaining game over certain substantive and procedural stakes.' 28
The goal of each side is to maximize its share of these stakes.' 29 By
focusing on this distributional conflict, the bargaining theory of the
firm allows us to identify weaknesses within agency theory. Part II will
explain the bargaining theory of the firm and explain how this theory
addresses the inadequacies of agency theory's underlying
assumptions.
ing costs. However, this is completely true only as long as managers own significant
amounts of equity in the corporation. It is only then that they experience the disciplining
effect of the capital markets from the discounting of the price of the stock by potential
purchasers of the shares. AsJensen and Meckling admit at the end of their article, "[o]ne
of the most serious limitation[s] of the analysis is that as it stands we have not worked out
in this paper its application to the very large modem corporation whose managers own
little or no equity." Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 356. Fama andJensen addressed
this issue by focusing on the role of market constraints. See Fama &Jensen, supra note 31,
at 312-15.
126 SeeJensen, Organization Theory, supra note 31, at 331; see also Pratt & Zeckhauser,
supra note 18, at 6 (principal and agent have incentives to define monitoring and incentive
structures that produce an outcome similar to that which would result if monitoring were
costless). Jensen's argument is partially based on the assumption that the organizations
that survive market competition will be the ones that minimize agency costs. See Fama &
Jensen, supra note 31, at 302 (the most efficient firm survives);Jensen, Organization Theoiy,
supra note 31, at 331. This argument assumes that the market constraints upon which
Jensen relies are robust and that information regarding the level of agency costs is easily
disseminated. For a further critique of the evolutionary theory, see supra notes 94-104 and
accompanying text. See also KNIGHT, supra note 86, at 96-108.
127 See Butler, supra note 32, at 110 ("[M]anagers select the least cost manner of con-
trolling agency costs.");Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 328.
128 For a discussion of these substantive and procedural stakes, see infra notes 137-41
and accompanying text.
129 In essence, agency theory fails to take into account the role of distributive conflict
in undermining the optimality and stability of agency contracts. The agency costs must be
factored into a wider bargaining context. Doing so demonstrates that the optimal con-
tracts advanced by agency theory provide a distorted view of shareholder-manager rela-
tions. Furthermore, the stability of these contracts is thrown into question when one
factors in this ongoing distributive conflict. This is particularly true with the contracts of
shareholder-manager relationships, most of which are implicit and not subject to third-
party enforcement.
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II
A BARGAINING THEORY OF THE FIRM
I have argued above that agency theory does not provide a com-
plete and coherent theory of shareholder-manager relations.'3 0 In
this Part, I argue that these relations can be better explained if
modeled as an ongoing bargaining game between managers and
shareholders. Bargaining theory addresses the weaknesses of agency
theory and managerialist theory by focusing more intently on several
factors: the strategic behavior of managers and shareholders; the bar-
gaining costs produced by such strategic behavior; the dynamic, ongo-
ing nature of stockholder-manager relationships; the role of
managerial discretion and informational asymmetries; and the issue of
institutional emergence and change.
A bargaining context exists when two or more parties negotiate
over the possibility of undertaking some cooperative venture.13' Os-
borne and Rubenstein have described the typical bargaining problem
as one in which "(i) individuals.., have the possibility of concluding a
mutually beneficial agreement, (ii) there is a conflict of interests
about which agreement to conclude, and (iii) no agreement may be
imposed on any individual without his approval." 3 2
These criteria are met in the shareholder-manager context. First,
shareholders and managers can create a bargaining surplus by coop-
erating and coordinating their actions. 33 Second, because there is
more than one way of structuring an agreement to cooperate and be-
130 In particular, agency theory fails to fully account for the weakness of market and
contractual constraints, the existence of managerial discretion, and the effect of the distri-
butional conflict that pervades the shareholder-manager relationship. See supra part I.B.
131 See Harsanyi, supra note 24, at 54; Nash, supra note 24, at 155.
As Robert Cooter has pointed out, the key to a bargaining game is that the production
of the surplus is contingent on the ability of the parties to reach an agreement on distribu-
tion. Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1982); see also STEVEN J.
BRAms, NEGOTIATION GAMSs: APPLYING GAME THEORY TO BARGAINING AND ARBITRATION 29
(1990) ("The bargaining problem concerns how to get players in a conflict to reach an agree-
ment that is in their mutual interest when it is in each player's individual interest to hold
out for as favorable a settlement as possible."). See genera/!y THOMAS C. SCHELUNG, THE
STRATEGY OF CoNFUCT (1960) (classic account of bargaining and coordination games). A
bargaining game will involve a series of offers and counteroffers by the parties, with each
trying to convince the other that it is committed to acting in a certain way.
132 OSBORNE & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 25, at 1.
133 Shareholders and managers interact on an ongoing basis in a number of contexts,
including (1) regular corporate interactions, such as election of directors, dissemination of
information to shareholders, and decisions on payment of dividends and the compensa-
tion of managers; (2) non-regular governance transactions, such as voting on antitakeover
amendments and other types of non-regular resolutions; and (3) extraordinary transac-
tions, such as mergers and dispositions of substantial amounts of assets. By cooperating in
these interactions, shareholders and managers can produce a surplus. For a discussion of
the mechanisms used in bargaining, see infra part II.C.
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cause different agreements yield different distributional outcomes, 34
managers and shareholders will have a conflict of interest'35 over
which agreement to reach. In other words, individual interests con-
flict with the collective interest in reaching a bargain as quickly and as
cheaply as possible.'3 6 Finally, no agreement may be forced on either
party, given that each party can choose to exit the corporation.
A. The Stakes: Substantive and Procedural
We must first get a better idea about the stakes over which share-
holders and managers bargain. I divide the stakes into two categories:
substantive stakes and procedural stakes.
1. Substantive Stakes
The substantive stakes are what I shall call the "net organizational
revenues." These are the revenues of the firm after all fixed claimants
are paid. For example, think of a firm with one shareholder, one
manager, two nonmanagement employees, and a ten-year bank loan.
At the end of year one, the firm will have produced a certain total
134 Gains to shareholders arising from the adoption of stricter governance mecha-
nisms often come at the expense of managers. Rational managers would want to prevent
shareholders from imposing stricter governance mechanisms. For example, if the board of
directors is voted out of office or if managers lose a vote to adopt a poison pill, sharehold-
ers are better off and managers are worse off. If, on the other hand, shareholders lose on
both issues, then managers are better off and shareholders are worse off. See generally
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Re-
sponding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fis-
chel, The Proper Role] (arguing that allowing management to use defensive tactics in the
face of a tender offer diminishes shareholder welfare); Eugene Furtado & Vijay Karan,
Causes, Consequences, and the Shareholder Wealth Effects of Management Turnover A Review of the
Empirical Evidence, 19 FIN. Mcr. 60 (1990).
135 Thomas Schelling's classic book on bargaining is in fact a study of "the strategy of
conflict." SCHELLING, supra note 131. Schelling begins with the assumption that "most
conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations. They are situations in which the
ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important degree on the
choices or decisions that the other participants will make." Id. at 5. As Schelling points
out, a bargaining game is a game of strategy, in which there is an interdependence in the
decisionmaking process and in which the best course of action for each player depends on
how the other players will act. Id. at 1 n.1.
136 Analyzing the causes of bargaining breakdown is important when the parties have
incomplete information, as .they do in the shareholder-manager context. Surprisingly,
traditional bargaining models have by and large avoided the issue of bargaining break-
down by assuming that an efficient settlement will be reached. SeeV. P. Crawford, A Theory
of Disagreements in Bargaining in THE ECONOMICS OF BARGAINING 122 (Ken Binmore &
Partha Dasgupta eds., 1987). In addition to Crawford's piece, numerous recent articles
have dealt with the issue of bargaining breakdown. See e.g., Kalyan Chattejee, Disagreement
in Bargaining: Models with Incomplete Information, in GAME THEORETIC MODELS OF BARGAIN-
ING 9 (1985) (discussing recent models of two-player bargaining with incomplete informa-
tion); Cooter, supra note 131 (analyzing Coase's concrete examples); Robert Cooter &
Stephen Marks, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982) (discussing pretrial bargaining and settlement); Kennan & Wilson,
supra note 103 (examining the role of information in bargaining).
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amount of revenue, R From this total revenue we need to subtract
the cost of producing the output being sold, C, including the cost of
raw materials and the wages of the two nonmanagement employees,
and the principal amount and interest due to the bank on the ten year
loan, P. Thus, the net organizational revenue is R - (C + P).
This net organizational revenue will be split between the man-
ager and the shareholder. For example, the manager will be paid
compensation and the shareholder will receive dividends and retained
earnings.13 7 Shareholders benefit from retained earnings when the
firm reinvests them in projects with positive net present values, which
in turn is reflected in share price. The shareholder and manager will
bargain over how much compensation'3 8 the manager will receive and
the value of the dividends the shareholder will receive. These stakes
are the net organizational revenues. If both parties could agree how
to divide the stakes at zero cost, then the whole surplus would be pre-
served. Each party, however, will try to maximize her share of the
stakes, which will lead to partial or complete dissipation of the
surplus.
2. Procedural Stakes
A number of constraints affect the shareholder-manager bargain-
ing environment, including laws, informal institutional rules, and
market mechanisms. The adoption of a particular institutional rule
may benefit one party at the expense of the other, and because share-
holders and managers are repeat players, they will have an interest in
shaping these institutional constraints so as to affect future bargaining
interactions. The bargaining interactions that contribute to the emer-
gence and shaping of these constraints is what I call bargaining over
"procedural stakes."'139
In the shareholder-manager context, these procedural stakes in-
clude the following issues: the adoption of antitakeover devices;
changes in state antitakeover laws; changes in the proxy rules; require-
ments of increased disclosure of management compensation; changes
in the capital structure; investment decisions to increase the value of
137 See STEPHEN A. Ross & RANDOLPH W. WESTEMRsELD, CoRPoRATE FINANCE 13-16 (2d
ed. 1988).
138 This compensation can be direct or indirect. Shirking (i.e., not working as hard as
they would in a business they owned) and nonmonetary perquisites are means by which
managers take their cut of net revenues before the revenues are generated. SeeJensen &
Meckling, supra note 10, at 312-13.
139 The history of shareholder-manager relations over the last 30 years, including con-
cerns about the voting mechanism, the race to the bottom, composition of the board,
management compensation, manager resistance to takeovers (including opposing actual
takeovers, adopting antitakeover devices, and lobbying for anti-takeover statutes), and,
more recently, manager opposition to changing the proxy rules, illustrates the persistence
of this strategic behavior over these procedural stakes.
[Vol. 80:540
BARGAINING THEORY
the current management team, as well as other attempts at entrench-
ment; attempts by managers to change the preferences of sharehold-
ers;140 and attempts by managers to change the perceptions of the
board of directors, the company's independent accountants, regula-
tors, industry analysts, and financial intermediaries. Managers often
spend company resources pursuing these goals. With the increase in
institutional investor activism, one can expect that shareholders will
increase their bargaining over procedural stakes. 14'
B. Why Shareholders and Managers Bargain: Managerial
Discretion and Informational Asymmetries
The existence of managerial discretion and informational asym-
metries leads to strategic behavior and bargaining by managers and
shareholders. 42 Once we take full account of managerial discretion
and informational asymmetries, we will be able to cast some doubt on
the conclusion that managers have an incentive to minimize agency
costs and act "as if they have shareholders' interest at heart." 43
1. Why Bargain?
Shareholders have recently become more involved in corporate
governance issues,'4 including negotiating directly with managers. 145
In the next section, I discuss more fully the mechanics of bargaining
by shareholders, but for now I focus on why shareholders and manag-
ers would want to bargain. The simple answer, of course, is that these
parties believe that they can gain something from bargaining. In a
world of perfect competition there would be no room for bargain-
ing.146 As we have seen, however, this is not the world inhabited by
shareholders and managers-in their world of managerial discretion
and informational asymmetries, there is plenty of room for
bargaining.
140 Annual reports, proxy statements, and shareholder relations departments are all
"legitimate" ways for managers to change shareholder preferences. They can be seen as
part of one big advertisement campaign on behalf of management policy. Many managers
are in the business of trying to influence consumer preferences to get them to buy the
company's product; it should not be surprising that managers would use similar strategies
to sell the product that they value the most-themselves.
141 For example, trying to change the composition of boards, increase disclosure re-
quirements for managers, and change the proxy rules. Cf Black, Sharehol&rPassivity, supra
note 13, at 570-75 (discussing specific examples of institutional shareholder activism).
142 This result is due to the weakness, addressed above, of the market, contractual, and
evolutionary constraints on which agency theory relies. For a discussion of problems with
these assumptions, see supra notes 49-104 and accompanying text.
143 Butler, supra note 32, at 122 (emphasis omitted).
144 For a more detailed discussion, see supra notes 20, 118-21 and infra notes 163-68
and accompanying text.
145 See infra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
146 See Kennan & Wilson, supra note 103, at 47 n.7.
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Our initial answer can now be expanded: shareholders and man-
agers bargain because they believe that they can increase the size of
their slice of the corporate pie through bargaining. 147 The operative
word here is believe. The parties are involved in a game 148 in which
their beliefs are shaped through interactions with each other. Be-
cause of bounded rationality 49 and other informational problems,
parties will often find it difficult to value the true costs of their strate-
gic behavior. This is particularly true in the corporate context, in
which the results (and thus the penalties) of a party's decision to take
the "wrong" action may not be immediately apparent and may be af-
fected by numerous factors, not all of which can be identified or veri-
fied. As a result, the equilibrium outcome may be random, so that the
same decision will sometimes benefit and sometimes hurt the party.150
The existence of managerial discretion and informational asymme-
tries, which I analyze in the next section, encourages bargaining and
exacerbates the problems I have just discussed.
2. The Effect of Managerial Discretion
Managerialists argue that managers have virtually unfettered dis-
cretion. The way to maximize shareholder wealth, they believe, is by
limiting such discretion-a job that they assign to courts and legisla-
147 The net return to managers can increase if their actions lead to an increase in the
size of the corporate pie. More importantly, however, their net return may in certain cases
increase even if the pie remains the same or becomes smaller. The latter scenario would
occur if the managers could capture a share of the bargaining surplus exceeding the net
losses associated with their strategic behavior.
148 A "game" for this purpose is defined as
a situation in which the actions of one person perceptibly affect the welfare
of another or vice versa.... [T] he basic method of game theory is to argue
that individuals try to predict what others will do in reply to their own ac-
tions, and then optimize on the understanding that others are thinking in
the same way.
SHAUN H. HEAP ET AL., THE THEORY OF CHOICE 94 (1992).
149 For discussion of bounded rationality, see I HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF
THOUGHT 3 (1979). Simon states:
The point of departure is the observation that human thinking powers are
very modest when compared with the complexities of the environments in
which human beings live. If computational powers were unlimited, a per-
son would simply consult his or her preferences (utility functions) and
choose the course of action that would yield maximum utility under the
given circumstances. That is, of course, just what the "rational man" of
classical economic theory does. But real human beings of bounded ration-
ality ... must be content to satisfice-to find "good enough" solutions to
their problems.
Id.; WILLIAMSON, supra note 70, at 45-46.
150 For a further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
Of course, one role of informal and formal institutions-e.g., conventions, habits, and
laws-is to bring some certainty to these interactions. See KNIGHT, supra note 86, at 22-25;
DAVID LEwIS, CONVENION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT,
THE EMERGENCE OF NoRMs (1977).
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tors. 15 1 Agency theorists admit the existence of some managerial dis-
cretion but argue that what we see is the best that we can get.152
Bargaining theory argues that the amount of managerial discre-
ion is more akin to that described by managerialists but argues that
both markets and rules-formal (legal) rules and informal (institu-
tional) rules-are the source of any potential alignment of managerial
and shareholder interests. It concludes that to better understand how
that alignment occurs and the role played by strategic behavior, we
must focus on the bargaining nature of the relationship. In other
words, what we see is not necessarily the best that we can get.
Bargaining theory begins with the principle that the economic
rewards of managers are not all contractually determined or the prod-
uct of an "invisible hand." In fact, such rewards are influenced by a
numbers of factors, including (1) the performance of the company,
(2) informational asymmetries, (3) the interaction between share-
holders and managers (in the proxy context among others), (4) the
efforts of managers (including their effort in acquiring company-spe-
cific information and knowledge), and (5) exogenous factors. 153 As a
result, managers and shareholders bargain over certain substantive
stakes-the net organizational revenues. At the end of each period,
when the managers slice the corporate pie, they will neither be com-
pletely constrained by markets and contracts nor be completely free
from such constraints. The strength of the constraints for each partic-
ular period is the subject of bargaining between shareholders and
managers.
Agency theorists, on the other hand, "designate" shareholders as
the sole residual owners of the corporation.154 This means that share-
holders will be entitled to the revenues remaining after all other con-
tractual claimants of the firm are paid.155 However, naming
shareholders the "sole residual owners" may prove to be just that-a
151 See supra notes 8-8 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text for discussion of the "Nirvana fallacy."
153 These are somewhat analogous to those set forth by Masahiko Aoki when discuss-
ing shareholder-labor bargaining. See MASAHiKO Aoiu, INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND BAR-
GAINING IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 154-55 (1988) [hereinafter Aou, INFORMATION].
154 While we may desire such a result as a normative goal, it does not follow that it
describes the current state of the world. Given the level of managerial discretion, it is inac-
curate to conclude that managers are not residual holders. Some theorists have argued
that non-management employees of the firm are residual claimants who bargain with the
other residual claimants, the shareholders, over the residuals of the corporation. SeeAoiu,
CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY, supra note 17, at 61-62; AOKI, INFORMATION, supra note 153, at
154-55.
155 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUcruRE, supra note 11, at 24-25;
Fama, supra note 31, at 290. In the nexus of contract theory, these fixed-claim claimants
include managers, labor, debtholders, etc. (everybody except the shareholders).
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name-in a world of substantial managerial discretion, in which con-
tractual and market constraints are weak.' 56
3. The Effect of Informational Asymmetries
In order to understand the role of managerial discretion in share-
holder-manager bargaining, we must understand the role played by
informational asymmetries. The relationship between shareholders
and managers is filled with informational asymmetries. Because man-
agers run the day-to-day affairs of the corporation, they have greater
access to and control over information regarding the prospects of the
enterprise, the level of managerial effort, and the results of their prior
actions and decisions. Managers also enjoy greater control over the
creation, memorialization, and dissemination of information. These
informational asymmetries increase the discretion of managers and
affect the ability of shareholders to monitor and discipline them.
For example, the managers of a large public corporation have
informational advantages in several different scenarios. They have
better access to information of the following types: information re-
garding the firm's performance, including information about market
conditions, new or potential competitors, the loss of key customers,
the growing dissatisfaction or impending bankruptcy of such custom-
ers, and so on; information regarding how hard the managers and
their colleagues are working, how competent or incompetent they
are, and the personal ties among those in the managerial ranks; and
information regarding how carefully managers make decisions regard-
ing investments, the disposition of assets, product development, and
the expansion of markets. When a decision leads to a negative out-
come (for example, when managers make a bad investment decision),
managers have an informational advantage in evaluating these deci-
sions after the fact. Managers will have an incentive to blame such
negative results on extraneous, unexpected events.
In the end, shareholders have to rely (to a great degree) on the
information that managers reveal to them, whether managers do so
voluntarily or under legal obligation. Not all relevant information will
be revealed to shareholders, and the veracity of that which is released
cannot be completely verified.' 57 Thus, as a result of managerial dis-
156 Viewing shareholders as the sole residual claimants does not make sense unless one
of two things is shown: (1) that the economic rewards to the fixed claimants are all con-
tractually determined ex ante or (2) that there are certain market constraints that do not
allow these other claimants to try to bargain for a share of the residuals. See AoyI, Co-
OPERATVE GAME THEORY, supra note 17; Aoiu, INFORMATION, supra note 153, at 150-51 (for
point (1)); Kennan & Wilson, supra note 103, at 47 n.7 (for point (2)).
157 For discussion of the pros and cons of requiring managers to disclose more infor-
mation, see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1988); TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-50 (1976).
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cretion and informational asymmetries, the economic rewards to man-
agers and shareholders are not determined contractually, ex ante.
This allows for a bargaining region to exist and thus leads to bargain-
ing between shareholders and managers over the division of the cor-
porate pie.
C. The Mechanics of Bargaining
In this subpart, I focus on the mechanics of shareholder-manager
bargaining. First I discuss the nature of managerial bargaining and
then examine shareholder bargaining (that is, how shareholders can
be said to be involved in a bargaining game). Shareholder bargaining
is discussed within two distinct historical periods: bargaining during
the era of institutional investor activism, and bargaining before insti-
tutional investor activism. I then discuss bargaining asymmetries that
arise, and conclude by examining inefficiencies arising out of the bar-
gaining interaction.
1. The Nature of Managerial Bargaining
It is easy to conceptualize managers as being involved in a bar-
gaining context, given that the group of managers is much smaller
than that of shareholders. As we have seen, managers control corpo-
rate assets, corporate-specific information, investment decisions, deci-
sions regarding the capital structure of the firm, and the firm's
dividend policy. Thus, managers have the opportunity (and incen-
tive) to engage in strategic behavior vis-a-vis shareholders. As a result,
almost all management decisions can be seen as part of a bargaining
game in which managers are either determining the current division
of the corporate pie or positioning themselves to obtain a bigger slice
of the pie in the future.' 58
2. The Nature of Shareholder Bargaining
Shareholders, however, are part of a larger and less homogene-
ous group. Furthermore, they are subject to the collective action
problems discussed above. 159 As a result, we need to justify the propo-
sition that shareholders actually bargain. In analyzing the mechanics
158 Managers will behave strategically at t=1 so that they can gain a bargaining advan-
tage at t=2. This behavior may include creating or changing institutions, changing the
capital structure, or making investment decisions so as to make themselves indispensable
in the future. See S-nGLrrz & EDUN, supra note 3, at 5 (arguing that managers make invest-
ment decisions so as to entrench themselves by making it more costly to replace them in
the future); see also Andrei Schleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The
Case of Manager-Specific Investments, 25J. FIN. ECON. 123 (1989) (managers entrench them-
selves by making manager-specific investments that make it costly for shareholders to re-
place them).
159 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text..
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of shareholder bargaining, it is useful to look at two different periods
of shareholder bargaining. The first is the period prior to the mid-to-
late 1980s, before institutional investors became earnestly involved in
corporate governance issues.160 The second is the period from the
mid-to-late 1980s to the present, when institutional investor activism
began to take hold. 161
Bargaining requires some sort of communication, whether ex-
plicit or implicit, between the parties.' 62 Shareholders bargain with
managers through both explicit and implicit communication. There is
no need for actual negotiations in the normal sense of the word. In-
stead, what is needed is a realization that cooperation can bring the
parties greater gains than they would realize working alone. Through
ongoing interactions and explicit or implicit acts, the parties will even-
tually either agree to cooperate or fail to reach such an agreement.
Having this model in mind, I will look at how shareholders currently
bargain, given the growth in shareholder activism in the last few years.
I will then look at how they can be deemed to be bargaining implic-
itly, even if we assume a world of little direct shareholder activism.
a. Bargaining in the Era of Institutional Investor Activism
Shareholder activists have begun to make their own governance
proposals, to oppose managers' proposals and managers' slates of di-
rectors, and to negotiate directly with management and outside direc-
tors. Some institutional investors, such as the California Public
Employees Retirement System (CaPERS), have taken a very active
role in directly negotiating with management and board members. 163
160 See Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 13, at 526-29.
161 As we will see, this division is somewhat artificial, since all that has changed from
one period to the other is the amount of explicit bargaining being carried out by share-
holders, through their institutional investor "representatives."
162 As Schelling points out
The bargaining may be explicit, as when one offers a concession; or it may
be by tacit maneuver, as when one occupies or evacuates strategic territory.
It may, as in the ordinary haggling of the market-place, take the status quo as
its zero point and seek arrangements that yield positive gains to both sides;
or it may involve threats of damage, including mutual damage, as in a
strike, boycott, or price war, or in extortion.
SCHELLrNG, supra note 131, at 5.
163 See Susan Pullman, Calpers Goes Over CEOs'Heads in Its Quest for Higher Returns, WALL
ST. J.,Jan. 22, 1993, at C1 (CaPERS begins to negotiate directly with board members and
with management in companies such as General Motors, Westinghouse Electric, Advanced
Micro Devices, Boise Cascade, Champion International and Sizzler International). Dale
Hanson, the head of CalPERS, has said "that [CalPERS'] objective is dialogue, dialogue"
and has proceeded to negotiate directly on behalf of other shareholders. See George An-
ders, While Head of Calpers Lectures otherFirms, His Own Board Frets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1993,
at 1; see alsoJohnnie L Roberts, Time WarnerAsks Big ShareholderFor Board Advice, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 21, 1993, at B6. The degree of activism is indicated by the following comments
attributed to Dale Hanson, chief executive officer of CalPERS:
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Institutional investors have also begun to adopt active investment
strategies aimed at directly influencing managers' decisions.'6
Institutional investors are thereby acting as representatives for
other shareholders in bargaining with managers and board members.
This increased level of explicit bargaining raises several questions.
When should we encourage such representation by institutional inves-
tors? In other words, when do we want to encourage bargaining?
When would bargaining be inefficient? What institutions have arisen
or may arise to deal with this increased bargaining? How quickly will
the current institutions, such as that of "exit," change under these new
circumstances?1 65
Let us now look at an example of the mechanics of bargaining by
institutional investors. In the 1991 proxy season, CalPERS announced
that it would no longer make shareholder proposals but would instead
attempt to negotiate directly with the management of companies in its
portfolio that were underperforming. CalPERS, however, did not
meet with much success in its quest to have management negotiate
and eventually returned to its policy of making shareholder proposals
to supplement its continued attempts to influence managers and
board members through independent negotiations. Some commen-
tators believe that these types of informal negotiations will prove to be
the most useful.166
As a case in point, Mr. Hanson cited IIT Corp. "Relationship investing is
being able to say to Howard Aibel [ITr's executive vice president and chief
legal counsel]: 'Congratulations. Your stock hit $83,'" Mr. Hanson said.
"We began our conversations [with T management] about $45 ago."
Joseph P. White, Calpers Activist Chief Wants to Take Larger Holdings in Fewer Companies, WALL
ST. J., May 7, 1993, at A12.
164 See Lilli A. Gordon &John Pound, Active Investing in the U.S. Equity Markets: Past
Performance and Future Prospects (1993) (report prepared for CalPERS, Jan. 11, 1993)
(on file with author). According to Gordon and Pound, active strategies
typically involve exerting significant influence over corporate policy or con-
trol over the corporate entity in the hope of elevating the value of the firm.
An active investment strategy is thus one in which the returns derived from
a given investment are endogenous-subject to influence by the individual
investor after the investment is made. In economic terms, an active investor
views [herself] as having market power, namely, the power to affect the
outcome of an investment strategy by virtue of direct actions that... she
undertakes.
Id. at 9.
165 Questions like this one are best addressed through a bargaining theory of the firm.
However, such questions are outside the scope of this Article.
166 See Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 13, at 847 ("Much of the value of insti-
tutional oversight will come through informal manager response to the wishes of large
shareholders and through negotiated compromises."). While Black recognizes that negoti-
ations without a credible threat will fail (as they in fact did), he does not focus on the true
strategic nature of the shareholder-manager relationship. Id. at 848. In fact, he has a very
optimistic view about the way managers will behave in reaction to increased shareholder
involvement, which fails to fully take into account the distributive conflict involved. See id.
at 848-49.
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We can better evaluate why CalPERS' negotiation posture met
with failure and assess the viability of these informal negotiations in
the future by focusing on the issue of bargaining power. CalPERS'
strategy of not making shareholder proposals and relying solely on
negotiations failed because CaPERS could not make a credible threat
to force managers to negotiate. As I have argued, managers will bar-
gain over redistributing corporate income (the "substantive stakes")
only if they have no other choice. We cannot rely on the benevolence
of managers, as some commentators seem to do.16 7 Furthermore, we
cannot rely on the assumption that shareholders, as principals, can
somehow force managers to act in the best interest of shareholders.
Such a view does not consider the Frankenstein effect discussed
above.' 68
This does not mean, however, that such direct bargaining be-
tween shareholders and managers will not be successful in the fir-
ture.1 69 What it does mean is that one needs to consider the
distributive conflict involved and how the bargaining power of the
parties will influence the bargaining outcome.
b. Bargaining Before Institutional Investor Activism
Shareholders want to maximize the amount of the substantive
and procedural stakes that they receive when the corporate pie is di-
vided. Managers have the same interest in maximizing their slice of
the pie. Each party behaves strategically to achieve its goal. It is usu-
ally assumed that shareholders are not involved in bargaining with
managers because they are a dispersed group of individuals who
would rather not become involved in corporate governance because
of collective action problems. I will argue, however, that shareholders
are involved in both explicit and implicit bargaining with managers.
Shareholders sometimes bargain through representatives, or entre-
preneurs °70 who act notwithstanding the collective action problem.
Shareholders also bargain individually even when there are no repre-
sentatives or entrepreneurs involved.
167 See, e.g., id. at 847-48; RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863, 905 (1991).
168 See supra part I.D.1. In other words, in the shareholder-manager context, "your
servant is your master." THE POLICE, Wrapped Around Your Finger, on SYNcHRONICrIY (A&M
Records 1983).
169 In fact, CaIPERS has met with more success recently, after jettisoning its no share-
holder proposal policy. See George Anders, Wile Head of Calpers Lectures Other Firms, His
Own Board Frets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1993, at A9.
170 See TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS: INCENTVES AND THE INTERNAL
DINAMics OF POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS 36-37 (1980) (describing the "political
entrepreneur").
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i. Bargaining through representatives
Shareholders bargain with managers through representatives.
The most obvious example is the board of directors. The board can
be characterized as a representative of shareholders insofar as it nego-
tiates with managers over compensation, investment decisions, and
many other decisions that require board approval. 171 The board, of
course, is not a perfect representative of shareholders. Board mem-
bers are usually nominated, and, in many cases, are co-opted by man-
agers.172 Nevertheless, boards have proven to be useful bargaining
agents for shareholders during extraordinary situations, such as take-
overs and severe business downtums. 73
Shareholders who bring derivative suits act as representatives for
other shareholders in bargaining with managers. Derivative suits al-
low shareholders to become directly involved in a past or future deci-
sion or action by management on behalf of the corporation.
Shareholders traditionally have not been involved in such direct ac-
tion because corporation law requires that they rely on the board as
their representative in dealing with management. 7 4
The proxy system is another venue through which one or more
shareholders can act as representatives of other shareholders in bar-
gaining with management. By significantly increasing their voting
power, the representatives can bargain over substantive issues or the
composition of the board of directors (and thus, indirectly, over the
composition of management).
In each of the circumstances noted above, shareholders directly
or indirectly communicate to managers certain preferences and make
certain threats. Managers react to these preferences and threats by
ascertaining the expected actions of shareholders and devising a bar-
gaining strategy accordingly. For example, managers may give in to
the board on a policy matter, they may fight a derivative suit or opt for
171 Cf. DEL CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1993) ("The business and affhirs of every corpo-
ration ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors .... ").
172 SeeJames D. Cox & Harry L Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: PsychologicalFounda-
lions and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAw & CowTrmp. PROBS., Summer 1985,
at 83; Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Governance-The Role of Special Lit igation Committees, 68
WASH. L. REv. 79, 102-16 (1993) (analyzing "structural bias" of special litigation
committees).
173 Recent examples include the resignations of top executives at American Express,
Westinghouse Electric, and Eastman Kodak, precipitated by Board action. See Corporate
Chiefs Polish their Relations with Director, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1993, at Bi, B9.
174 The demand requirement in derivative suits is a way of distinguishing those cases in
which the board is so tainted that it cannot be trusted to act as the representative of the
shareholders. For a discussion of the rationale behind the demand requirement and of
the circumstances in which demand will be excused due to Board conflict of interest, see
generally Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
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a settlement, they may resist shareholder proposals, or they may im-
plement the suggested policy changes.
ii. Bargaining by individual shareholders and the emergence of
institutions
Shareholders do not bargain solely through representatives or en-
trepreneurs. Each individual shareholder is also involved in a bar-
gaining game with managers. This bargaining is of the implicit, tacit
kind analyzed by Schelling.175 Implicit bargaining is made possible by
indirect forms of communication. A shareholder is interested in max-
imizing the size of the slice she receives from the corporate pie and
therefore is interested in communicating her preferences and threats
to managers. In most cases, it is too costly for individual shareholders
to communicate explicitly with managers. However, both managers
and shareholders realize that their best course of action depends on
what the other party will do. For example, the threat of a derivative
suit, a proxy battle, selling of shares, or withholding future capital af-
fects management's bargaining power. Exiting the corporation or
threatening exit is a tacit bargaining technique used by individual
shareholders. 176 Such threats constrain managers because they create
a risk that shareholders will discipline them. 77
Viewing individual shareholders as being involved in a bargaining
game with managers is important because it allows us to explain the
emergence of certain institutions affecting shareholder-manager rela-
tions. These institutions suggest the existence of a bargaining rela-
tionship in which one party, management, has traditionally enjoyed a
great deal of bargaining power. Following Jack Knight, I will argue
that formal and informal institutions and rules relating to share-
holder-manager relations are a product of the strategic behavior of
shareholders and managers seeking as large a slice of the corporate
175 See SCHELLING, supra note 131, at 5.
176 Of course, the larger a shareholder's holding, the greater her bargaining power.
Some commentators would remove the individual shareholder from the equation and ar-
gue that managers are only bargaining against an abstract entity; that is, the market. See
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRucruRE, supra note 11, at 23-24. This is not a
very informative analysis of a context shaped by individual preferences, all of which are not
necessarily homogeneous. For a discussion of heterogeneous expectations, see, e.g., Rob-
ertJarrow, Heterogeneous Expectations, Restrictions on Short Sales, and Equilibrium Asset Prices, 35
J. FIN. 1105 (1980); Joram Mayshar, On Divergence of Opinion and Imperfections in Capital
Markets, 73 AMER. EcoN. REV. 114 (1983); Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergency
of Opinion, 32J. FIN. 1151 (1977).
177 Without the threat of shareholder action, we would expect managers to take at
least as big a slice of the corporate pie as fiduciary duties would allow. Of course, the
enforcement of fiduciary duties depends in turn upon shareholder action (i.e., bringing
derivative suits).
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pie as possible.'78 To achieve this distributive goal, managers will try
to force shareholders to take actions they would not otherwise take. 179
Managers use informational advantages and control over the assets
and resources of the corporation to affect the way shareholders act.
For example, the managers may force a shareholder to use the exit
option rather than the voice option. In time, individual shareholders
learn what to expect from managers and act accordingly. 80 This
learning and adaptation process leads to the emergence of institu-
tions that govern not only the actions of individual shareholders, but
also how shareholders act as a group.' 8 '
Some agency theorists conclude that the institution of exit'8 2 is
the optimal institution.8 3 They reach this conclusion on the basis
178 Jack Knight provides a bargaining theory of social institutions. He argues that so-
cial institutions and rules arise out of a process of strategic conflict in which actors vie for
distributional advantages. See KNIGHT, supra note 86, at 126. Frequently, these actors have
the potential to reach a mutually beneficial agreement, but come into conflict about how
to divide the bargaining surplus. Thus, they will adopt certain rules and institutions to
structure their interdependent activities and reach an equilibrium outcome in their bar-
gaining. These institutions will constrain strategic action and help achieve a bargaining
settlement. However, since more than one set of institutions or rules can be chosen, the
parties may disagree about which ones to adopt. The party with superior resources and
bargaining power will be able to force other parties "to act in ways contrary to their uncon-
strained preferences." Id. at 127 (emphasis omitted). Thus, Knight concludes that actors
respect both formal and informal rules "not because they have agreed to them and not
because they evolved as Pareto improvements but simply because they cannot do better
than to do so." Id. (emphasis omitted).
179 Thus, while an unconstrained shareholder would prefer to remove a manager who
is acting against her interest, she will instead opt for the "exit" strategy, given manage-
ment's greater bargaining power. On the exit-voice distinction, see ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN,
Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 36-43 (1970).
180 After awhile, shareholders will recognize the power asymmetries involved in their
relationship with managers. As Knight explains, in connection with the emergence of so-
cial institutions generally.
The interesting problem relates to the generalization of self-enforcing rules
through a decentralized emergence process: how commitments established
in individual interactions come to be recognized and respected as the ac-
cepted rule of action for the society as a whole. An answer can be found in
the ability of strategic actors to recognize those asymmetries in power that
support those commitments.
KNIGHT, supra note 86, at 140.
181 Important in the emergence of these institutions is the existence of frequent and
repeated interactions among shareholders and managers. On repeated games, see ROBERT
AXELROD, THE EvOLUTION OF COOPERATION 12, 182-83 (1984).
182 What I mean is the institution of choosing exit rather than voice. See Black, Share-
holder Passivity, supra note 13, at 522-24. The historical tendency by market participants to
choose exit rather than voice is sometimes referred to as the "Wall Street Rule," given that
sophisticated Wall Street investors often chose this path. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting,
supra note 32, at 417 (discussing the Wall Street Rule).
183 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRucruRE, supra note 11, at 83 & n.33
("Given the combination of a collective action problem and easy exit through the stock
market, the rational strategy for most dissatisfied shareholders is to sell rather than incur
costs in attempting to bring about change through votes." They go on to say, "The greater
the availability of the sale or exit opinion, the less desirable is the voting or voice option.").
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that it has survived.'8 However, the mere survival of an institution
does not qualify it as optimal.' 8 5 Institutions that arise from distribu-
tional conflicts in a bargaining context cannot automatically be as-
sumed to be Pareto superior. 186 Rather, the fact that established
institutions are hard to change is one explanation for their survival.' 8 7
Thus, from the perspective of bargaining theory, the "Wall Street
Rule" is not assumed to be the optimal institution merely because it
has survived. This is because changing inefficient institutions re-
quires, among other things, a change in the social expectations of the
individual actors involved.' 8 8
Another point that must be recognized is that the level of bar-
gaining is not the same in all types of manager-shareholder interac-
tions. For example, when shareholders bargain through a
representative, the level of bargaining is greater than when they bar-
gain tacitly with managers. Thus, the level of bargaining can be char-
acterized as lying on a continuum ranging from implicit, tacit
bargaining by individual shareholders to direct bargaining through
representatives. Bargaining theory focuses on the strategic behavior
of managers and shareholders at both ends of the continuum.
In this section I have set forth how shareholders are involved in
explicit and tacit bargaining with managers. Furthermore, I have ar-
gued that shareholder-manager relations have begun to move into an
era of increased explicit bargaining by shareholders through their
representatives-institutional investors. Now that we have seen how
For a discussion of why shareholders may choose not to participate in "voice" so as to keep
their "exit" options open, see Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control, supra note 16, at 1281 ("Inves-
tors that want liquidity may hesitate to accept control."). For a discussion of the traditional
theory that shareholder passivity is inevitable, see Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 13,
at 526-29; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting supra note 32, at 402 ("Indeed, the collec-
tive choice problems that attend voting in corporations with large numbers of contracting
parties suggest that voting would rarely have any function except in extrenis.").
184 For example, Fama andJensen assert that their "goal" is to explain the survival of
organizations characterized by separation of "ownership" and "control." Fama & Jensen,
supra note 31, at 301. They later emphasize the important role of the easy transferability of
shares and the role of the capital markets (through the "exit" mechanism) in disciplining
managers. Id. at 312-13. Easterbrook and Fischel find it necessary tojustify why the institu-
tion of voting has survived at all, given collective action problems and the ease of exit.
Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting, supra note 32, at 402, 406-08, 420.
185 See KNIGHT, supra note 86, at 96-97 (noting that the empirical evidence does not
support evolutionary theories); Victor Goldberg, RelationalExchange: Economics and Complex
Contracts, in THE ECONOMIC NATuRE OF THE FnRM, supra note 108, at 90.
186 This is because they arise in a context where power asymmetries influence the bar-
gaining outcome. See KNIGHT, supra note 86, at 36-37.
187 On the issue of "path-dependence," see NoRTH, supra note 68, at 93-95, 100; see also
KNIGHT, supra note 86, at 127 ("Once an institution is established, change comes slowly and
often at considerable cost. Institutional change entails a change in the equilibrium out-
come that social actors have come to recognize as the commonly anticipated solution to
problems of social interaction.").
188 KNIGHT, supra note 86.
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shareholders and managers bargain, the next two sections will address
the mechanics of shareholder-manager bargaining in greater detail,
by dealing with the issues of bargaining power and bargaining
breakdown.
3. Bargaining Power and Shareholder-Manager Bargaining
We now consider how a party's bargaining power affects the bar-
gaining outcome. In some situations one party may have certain bar-
gaining advantages, or bargaining power, over her opponent. 8 9
Taking into account these power asymmetries among parties allows us
to build a more complete bargaining scenario.' 90 A party with bar-
gaining power can influence her opponent's choice and therefore ex-
tract an outcome preferable to that which would otherwise be
possible.' 9 ' Specific types of bargaining power are discussed below.
a. Informational Asymmety
The existence of informational asymmetries can influence bar-
gaining outcomes. A party with superior information regarding objec-
tive factors in the bargaining process will have a bargaining advantage.
For example, if Ann and Sofia are bargaining over the sale of a house,
the fact that Ann (but not Sofia) knows that a landfill is being planned
right around the corner will give Ann a bargaining advantage.
The main bargaining advantage possessed by managers is that
they have superior information concerning their own performance,
the performance of the company, and the alternative projects and pol-
icies available. Furthermore, managers have better information about
the level of their investment in firm-specific human capital, which
would be lost if they were replaced by other managers. Thus, manag-
ers are better able to ascertain the true value of the substantive and
procedural stakes to be divided and the alternatives available if there
is a bargaining breakdown.
189 To illustrate, in a bargaining game between Ann and Sofia, Ann exercises power
over Sofia if Ann can affect the alternatives, or set of feasible alternatives, available to Sofia.
For example, Ann may be able to limit Sofia's alternatives so as to preclude certain ones
that would be in Sofia's best interest, or Ann can alter Sofia's valuation of certain alterna-
tives by threatening to retaliate against Sofia. See KNIGrr, supra note 86, at 41-42.
190 Using the concept of power to explain the actions of parties requires that one be
able to identify the power asymmetries ex ante- If this is not possible, one can use the
concept of power only as an expost rationalization for action, in which case it loses most of
its explanatory force. See KNIGHT, supra note 86, at 41.
191 Under standard bargaining theory the party with greater bargaining power will re-
ceive a larger piece of the pie being divided. See id. at 132; JOHN MAYNARD SMrrH, EVOLU-
TION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES 105 (1982). The credibility of a party's commitment to
taking a certain action is directly affected by the cost of bargaining and, hence, by the
power asymmetries present. SeeJoN ELsraa, THE CEMENT OF SociET. A STUDY OF SocIAL.
ORDER 72 (1989).
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b. Time Preference
Another cause of power asymmetry in bargaining is the fact that
bargaining is costly.192 The party who can better bear the costs of
bargaining will have a bargaining advantage. One of the costs of bar-
gaining is time:193 the greater the number of offers and counteroffers
and the greater the time interval between them, the costlier bargain-
ing will be. A party that can no longer afford the bargaining process
may have to accept an otherwise unsatisfactory resolution. Each party
will have preferences regarding when it wants to receive the payoffs of
bargaining. A party who can afford to wait for future payoffs will have
a bargaining advantage over a party who prefers more immediate
payoffs. The patient party will be better able to credibly communicate
to the other party that she does not mind waiting, 94 while the less
patient party will prefer a smaller slice of the pie now to a larger slice
in the future. 95
Trying to measure the relative time preferences of shareholders
and managers is not as straightforward as dealing with the issue of
informational asymmetry. First, the relative time preferences may vary
from company to company. For example, if the managers negotiating
with the shareholders are close to retirement' 96 or the company is
close to bankruptcy, 97 the managers may discount the future by a
greater amount than they would otherwise. Furthermore, if the share-
holders have large share holdings that they cannot readily sell without
negatively affecting the market price, they will discount the future less
than if they could easily and costlessly "exit" the firm.
192 See Etsra, supra note 191, at 69; Kennan & Wilson, supra note 103, at 45.
193 SeeJOHN G. CROSS, THE ECONOMICS OF BARGAINING 12-13 (1969):
[T]he passage of time has a cost in terms of both dollars and the sacrifice of
utility which stems from the postponement of consumption, and ... it is
precisely this cost which motivates the whole [bargaining] process. If it did
not matter when the parties agreed, it would not matter whether or not
they agreed at all.
(emphasis omitted).
194 See E=S'rER, supra note 191, at 75.
195 One can measure time preference by looking at the parameters by which each
party discounts the future. See KNIGHT, supra note 86, at 135.
196 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), presented such a situation. One
reading of the Van Gorkom case suggests that the chairman negotiating the sale of the
company was close to retirement and therefore wanted to resolve the investment tax credit
issue that had long been a problem for the corporation. For further discussion of Van
Gorkom and bargaining theory, see infra part IIIA.
197 For a discussion of why managers take more risks when they are closer to bank-
ruptcy, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice,
20J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1991); see also Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Path Com-
munications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (Footnote
55 of the case discusses the incentives of shareholders and managers as a corporation gets
close to insolvency.).
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The relative time preferences of the parties .play a larger role
when the issues being negotiated involve procedural stakes or the pos-
sible replacement of managers. This is because the resolution of the
conflict over procedural stakes will affect future bargaining between
shareholders and managers. Relative time preferences also play a role
in deciding the distribution of substantive stakes. For example, man-
agers may be willing to take a relatively smaller slice today if they know
that they will be around for a long time to receive future payoffs.' 98
Negotiations on certain corporate issues may go on for a long
time. One example is long term capital expenditure projects. Negoti-
ations regarding such projects extend beyond the proxy season,
although it is then that shareholders can make their most credible
threats.' 99 The longer the negotiation period, the greater the impor-
tance of the relative time preferences of shareholders and managers.
c. Fixed Costs
Bargaining also involves certain direct costs, such as fees paid to
lawyers, proxy solicitors, investment bankers, brokers, and other
agents, 20 0 and the opportunity costs of those involved in bargain-
ing.20' The party with the lowest fixed costs, everything else being
equal, will have a bargaining advantage, particularly if the negotia-
tions are prolonged. In the shareholder-manager bargaining scena-
rio, managers have a definite advantage because the corporation-
and, indirectly, the shareholders-bear the fixed costs of negotiating.
This includes the cost of the company's lawyers during informal nego-
tiations and the cost of defending management during a proxy
battle.2 02
198 Of course, the greater the increase in shareholder activism, the lower the
probability that managers will be able to retain their jobs indefinitely and, therefore, the
more managers will discount the future.
199 During other periods the shareholder could threaten to vote in a certain way dur-
ing the next proxy season or to "exit" the corporation.
200 See Kennan & Wilson, supra note 103, at 45. For example, let t = time and assume a
bargaining surplus of $1.00. Next assume that for every unit of time, t, Ann incurs a fixed
cost of $.05t and Sofia a fixed cost of $.2t. Thus, one must subtract these fixed costs from
the proposed payoff from bargaining. So, if Ann offers to split the surplus (.75, .25) with
Sofia at time t, Ann would get (.75-1 (.05)) and Sofia would get (.25-1(.2)). If instead Sofia
makes a counteroffer of (.60, .40) at time t=2, Ann would get (.60-2(.05)) and Sofia would
get (.40-2(.2)), which is less than Sofia would get if she settled at t-l. Thus Sofia cannot
credibly threaten to hold out to t-2, given her counter-offer of (.60, .40). See ELS=R, supra
note 191, at 72 (explaining Rubinstein's bargaining paradigm).
201 For example, the CalPERS board recently chided its chief executive officer, Dale
Hanson, for spending too much time on shareholder activism and not enough time run-
ning CaIPERS. Anders, supra note 163, at Al.
202 The majority rule is that managers will be reimbursed for the expenses of defend-
ing a proxy battle; insurgents will only be reimbursed if they are successful. See Rosenfeld
v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955). For a critique of this
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d. Risk Aversion
Bargaining power is also influenced by the parties' relative risk
aversion 203 and their relative breakdown values.204 A party with low
risk aversion or who is risk neutral will have a bargaining advantage
over a party who is more risk averse.205 By the same token, a party
who has less to gain from a positive bargaining outcome will also have
a bargaining advantage. Such a party can credibly communicate that
she is less concerned about a bargaining breakdown. 20 6 The party
may care less than the others because she has access to other options
or resources outside of this particular bargaining context.20 7
The relative risk aversion of managers and shareholders varies ac-
cording to the situation. Under finance theory, shareholders are usu-
ally assumed to be risk neutral because they can diversify their
portfolios, thereby reducing their company-specific risk.208 However,
this assumption does not always hold true when institutional investors
acquire large stakes in companies.20 9
Finance theory also casts managers as risk averse on the grounds
that they have invested human capital that they cannot diversify.210
However, this assumes that there is an efficient market for managers
that discounts the value of managers' firm-specific skills and expertise.
But it is not clear that there is such a high degree of efficiency in the
market for managers.211 Some commentators model managers as risk
rule and the negative incentive it creates, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A
Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAj. L. REv. 1071 (1990).
203 The level of risk aversion is influenced by a number of factors, including subjective
attitudes toward risks and the relative wealth of the parties (i.e., if Ann is wealthier than
Sofia, she will be willing to take more risks). See EISrER, supra note 191, at 80-81.
204 One can think of breakdown values as those resources and other options that are
available to each party if bargaining breaks down. See KNIGm, supra note 86, at 132.
205 See ELSTER, supra note 191, at 80-81.
206 See id.
207 For example, if one party is wealthier than the other or has learned to be content
with less, or if she has access to other similar options (i.e., if there is competition) then that
party will have bargaining power. See KNIGH-r, supra note 86, at 132. Some degree of bilat-
eral monopoly is required in a bargaining situation. If not, one or both of the parties may
be able to opt costiessly for a competitor's alternative options. See Kennan & Wilson, supra
note 103, at 47 n.7.
208 See !cHARD A. BRF.ALEY & STEWART C. MYERs, PIuNcIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
137-39 (4th ed. 1991) (The risk of any stock can be broken into two parts. There is unique
risk which is peculiar to that stock, and there is market risk which arises from market-wide
perils which threaten all businesses. Investors can eliminate unique risk by holding a well-
diversified portfolio.).
209 See GORDON & POUND, supra note 164, at 4 (discussing the risk to institutional inves-
tors of taking substantial positions and becoming involved in inducing corporate change,
which "open up the possibility of substantial losses if their strategies backfire").
210 See Fama, supra note 31, at 291-92.
211 See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
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neutral.212 Whatever the case, the party with the higher level of risk
aversion will be at a bargaining disadvantage.
e. Retaliation
The ability and willingness to retaliate against an opponent is an-
other bargaining advantage because the payoff to the party suffering
retaliation is reduced by the amount of punishment inflicted.213
Therefore, the threat of retaliation may lead a party to accept an
otherwise unsatisfactory outcome to avoid this cost. Retaliation, how-
ever, is usually costly to the party inflicting it, which may in turn call
into question the credibility of the threat.214
Managers can retaliate against institutional investors in a number
of ways. For example, managers can reduce or eliminate institutional
investors' access to soft information 215 or refuse to hire activist money
managers to run company pension funds.2 16 Managers can also resort
to more general retaliation against shareholders by taking actions that
will reduce the company's value in the short term, thus hurting share-
holders with short time horizons.217
Shareholders can retaliate against managers by voting them out
of office or by exiting the corporation. They can also bring derivative
suits if a manager has violated a fiduciary duty.218 Thus, in the corpo-
rate bargaining context, both managers and shareholders have retalia-
tory mechanisms at their disposal. The net effect on relative
bargaining power will vary with the circumstances.
4. Bargaining Breakdown, Informational Uncertainties, and Other
Inefficiencies of Bargaining
As we have seen, in a bargaining game each party tries to maxi-
mize the value of the distributions it receives. This distributional con-
flict can have a number of negative effects.
212 See, e.g., WIU.VASON, supra note 70, at 389 & n.5.
213 If we assume that Sofia prefers X' to X, but Ann can inflict a punishment, C, on
Sofia for choosing X', then at some point X > X'-C and Sofia will opt for X. See KNIGHT,
supra note 86, at 135.
214 See KNIGHr, supra note 86, at 135; SCHELUING, supra note 131, at 3543.
215 This would put the money manager running the fund at a disadvantage in her
competition with other money managers. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain)
Signficance of Institutional Shareholder Activim, 79 GEo. L.J. 445, 469-72 & n.83 (1991).
216 See id. at 469-71; Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 13, at 595-600.
217 Fiduciary duties can be seen as a way of limiting management's bargaining power.
In this way the law limits general retaliation by managers.
218 Statutes such as Delaware's corporations law allow managers to be reimbursed for
monetary damages arising out of violations of the duty of care. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b) (7) (1993). Officers' and directors' insurance also helps mitigate the usefulness
of this retaliatory device.
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One negative effect is the possibility that no agreement will be
reached at all and that the whole bargaining surplus will be lost.2 1 9 In
other words, there may be a bargaining breakdown. For example, the
distributive conflict between shareholders and managers may lead to a
company's bankruptcy or to the rejection by shareholders or manag-
ers of a transaction that would have otherwise produced a surplus,
such as a takeover, the issuance of new shares to finance expansion, or
the disposition of under-performing assets. 220
Another negative effect is that some of the bargaining surplus
may be dissipated even if an agreement is reached because of the cost
of the parties' strategic behavior.221 This second type of inefficiency is
more prevalent because both shareholders and managers have incen-
tives to engage in strategic behavior and any such behavior dissipates
the bargaining surplus.
In either case, the parties reach a socially inefficient result.2 22
These distributional losses occur because in the usual bargaining con-
text there exists no authoritative rule for dividing the stakes of the
game.2 23 As a result, parties need to agree on how to divide the stakes,
and in doing so, will engage in tactics meant to lead their opponents
to accept outcomes that are less favorable and that they would other-
wise reject.224
The existence of informational uncertainties can also lead to inef-
ficient results through distributional losses. 22 5 There are two types of
informational uncertainty that affect bargaining outcomes and in-
crease the possibility of a bargaining breakdown: uncertainty regard-
ing the preferences of the other party and uncertainty due to
219 Engaging in such distributional conflict increases the probability that no agree-
ment will be reached. See ErsrR, supra note 191, at 82; Cooter & Marks, supra note 136, at
227-28.
220 The fact that shareholders often vote with managers on some of these issues does
not mean that they are not bargaining with managers. Itjust means that the shareholders'
best possible strategy, given managers' bargaining power, is to side with management.
221 See ELSTER, supra note 191, at 82. This second negative effect, which we can call
"strategic bargaining costs," is different from agency theory's concept of agency costs. Stra-
tegic bargaining costs will comprise the monitoring costs, bonding costs, if any, and
residual loss of agency theory. However, agency costs fail to capture the essence of strate-
gic bargaining costs-the strategic behavior of parties intent on maximizing their share of
distributions. In a sense, the distinction is similar to the distinction drawn by Robert
Cooter between the Coase Theorem and the Hobbes Theorem. See Cooter, supra note 131,
at 18. Agency theory is too optimistic about the ability of parties to cooperate and fails to
give proper acknowledgement to the effects of distributional conflict.
222 See ELSTER, supra note 191, at 82.
223 This is because, as Cooter points out, production of the good depends on agree-
ment over the distributional issue. See Cooter, supra note 131, at 17; Cooter & Marks, supra
note 136, at 227-28.
224 See KNIGHT, supra note 86, at 127; Cooter & Marks, supra note 136, at 227-28.
225 On bargaining with imperfect information, see Kennan & Wilson, supra note 103.
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informational asymmetries regarding objective facts that are impor-
tant to the bargaining context.
One party's uncertainty regarding the other party's preferences
can yield inefficient results. A party may be characterized as a bundle
of observable and unobservable traits.2 26 That party's opponent can
form subjective estimates of the probability of various actions based on
the party's observable traits. After repeated interactions, the oppo-
nent will adjust these subjectively determined 'probabilities, and, over
time, the subjective estimates begin to correspond with the actual ob-
jective frequencies of the actions. Thus, the opponent's expectations
will match the objective probabilities associated with parties who have
the same observable traits.2 27 However, even at this equilibrium point,
bargaining breakdowns occur because unobservable traits remain. 228
The existence of unobservable traits explains why a party's actions
may differ from those of parties with similar observable traits-i.e.,
why the subjective distribution may differ from the objective
distribution.
A second form of informational uncertainty is produced by objec-
tive facts.2 29 One party may know more than the other about the bar-
gaining stakes or about alternative outcomes or actions. This
sometimes leads to socially inefficient outcomes.23 0
Distributional losses are also produced by parties' attempts to ma-
nipulate the bargaining environment. This behavior may include stra-
tegically distorting bargaining preferences, manipulating the physical
environment to gain a bargaining advantage, and influencing third
parties (such as the government) to shape the bargaining parameters
through laws and other actions that affect the disagreement point.2 3 '
Some of these efforts, however, may actually reduce distributional
losses. For example, shareholders may change the bargaining out-
come by having the Securities and Exchange Commission adopt more
226 Uncertainties regarding the preferences of other parties may include uncertainties
regarding time preference, risk aversion, fixed costs of bargaining, and the utility gains
from achieving a bargain. Furthermore, where bargaining stakes are multidimensional,
there may be uncertainty regarding the subjective tradeoffs among the different compo-
nents comprising the stakes. See ELsrtR, supra note 191, at 82-83. Some of these prefer-
ences may be inferred from the observable traits, but many of them will remain as
unobservable traits. When bargaining involves repeat players, the number of traits going
from unobservable to observable will increase.
227 See Cooter & Marks, supra note 136, at 232-33.
228 Id.
229 See ELSTER, supra note 191, at 83.
230 There is a wide variety of literature on the issue of informational asymmetry. See,
e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuck, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J.
ECON. 404 (1984); Sushil Bikhchandani, A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information, 59
REv. ECON. STUD. 187 (1992); Kennan & Wilson, supra note 103.
231 See ELSTER, supra note 191, at 88-91; NORTH, supra note 68, at 58-59.
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stringent disclosure rules, thereby reducing some of the informational
uncertainties.
Managers' greater discretion over the bargaining environment,
however, is a significant source of bargaining power. Managers have
the power to make investment decisions for the corporation and can
determine the amount of effort they will expend in managing the
company. Furthermore, managers decide how much company-spe-
cific information and knowledge they will acquire.23 2 The more they
invest in company-specific knowledge, the more efficiently the com-
pany will operate. These factors affect the net organizational revenues
produced. Furthermore, they give managers bargaining leverage over
shareholders.
Shareholders, through strategic behavior, can also change the
bargaining environment by affecting the level of net organizational
revenues produced. Shareholders have the power to remove manag-
ers.23 3 They can also refuse to provide additional capital to the corpo-
ration or make it more expensive for the corporation to raise capital
by "exiting" the corporation and putting downward pressure on the
price of its shares. Because shareholders do not have the same infor-
mation as managers, their behavior may produce inefficiencies. For
example, they may decide to remove managers who have acquired
company-specific information and who are really performing better
than their replacements would perform, at least in the short run.2 3 4
The strategic nature of bargaining also leads to inefficiencies.
Parties become accustomed to disguising their preferences and mak-
ing threats at the expense of the credibility of their message. Words
thus become cheap and must be replaced by actions. But actions are
expensive, and threats may not be credible unless they are occasion-
ally carried out. In addition, precommitting to certain strategies may
lead to a bargaining breakdown. In either case, social losses result.
The shareholder-manager context illustrates that the strategic na-
ture of bargaining can generate inefficient results. For example,
shareholders may not trust23 5 a manager who says that she will not
work for reduced compensation, and the manager, in return, may
232 How much of this information they will acquire is a function of how long they
predict their employment with the company will last.
233 They can do this by virtue of their power to elect board members. See DEL- CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1993).
234 Furthermore, managers may be reluctant to acquire company-specific information
if they are afraid that shareholders will remove them at the first sign of trouble. This may
be one reason why we do not see shareholder action causing much manager turnover.
235 See ARRow, supra note 100, at 23 ("Trust and similar values, loyalty or truth-telling,
are examples of what the economist would call 'externalities.' They are goods, they are
commodities; they have real, practical, economic value; they increase the efficiency of the
system, enable you to produce more goods or more of whatever values you hold in high
esteem.").
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find it necessary to back her threat with action-by quitting, which
may be the inefficient outcome. By the same token, the manager may
not believe the shareholders' threat to fire her, and the shareholders
may be forced to do so to make future threats credible to other
managers.
III
BARGAINING THEORY OF THE FiRM: APPLICATIONS AND
PRESCRIPTIONS
This Part sets forth concrete examples showing how bargaining
theory differs from agency theory. The claim is that bargaining theory
explains the relationship between shareholders and managers in a
more complete and coherent way. In particular, this Part analyzes
how bargaining theory prescribes different solutions in a number of
legal and institutional areas affecting the shareholder-manager
relationship.
A. The Van Gorkom Case and Bargaining Theory
In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Smith v. Van
Gorkom,236 a class action lawsuit brought by shareholders of Trans
Union Corporation seeking damages resulting from a merger. The
shareholders alleged that Trans Union's board of directors violated its
fiduciary duty in approving the merger by failing to acquire sufficient
information to make a decision. The court agreed and found the di-
rectors grossly negligent.2 37 The court held that the protection of the
business judgment rule, the "presumption that.., directors acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the ac-
tion taken was in the best interest of the company,"2 38 was not avail-
able because the board was not sufficiently informed.2 39
1. The Van Gorkom Case: An Agency Theory Approach
Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Dan Fischel argue that
the duty to be informed, imposed in Van Gorkom, is "anomalous" and
that the opinion, as an example of business judgment jurisprudence,
236 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
237 Id. at 893.
238 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
239 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872. The new standard set forth in the Van Gorkom opin-
ion was unexpected by the Delaware bar and inspired a great deal of commentary, most of
it negative. See, e.g., Dierdre A. Burgman & Paul N. Cox, Corporate Directors, Corporate Reali-
ties and Deliberative Process: An Analysis of the Trans Union Case 11J. CoRP. L. 311 (1986);
Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437
(1985); Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business
Judgment, 41 Bus. LAw. 1187 (1986).
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is an "outlier."240 They argue that judicial inquiry into the amount of
information gathered and reviewed by directors in making their deci-
sions is the sort of interference that the business judgment rule is
meant to prevent.241 There are limits to how much information man-
agers and board members need to make a good decision.242 Easter-
brook and Fischel view the problem as one of ascertaining who-
managers, shareholders, or courts-should determine how much in-
formation this is. They conclude that allowing shareholders and
courts to make this determination will lead to inferior results, given
that managers are guided by "the best incentives" in making these
decisions. 243
2. The Van Gorkom Case: A Bargaining Theory Approach
Managers use information in different ways. First, they use it to
make decisions on behalf of the corporation, such as investment deci-
sions, the development of new products, or the approval of extraordi-
nary transactions like the merger in Van Gorkom. Second, managers
impart information to the capital markets to convince investors to part
with their money.
But information is important to managers for another reason-
shareholders and the capital markets judge managers based on infor-
mation about their performance. A number of issues arise if we as-
sume that managers use information in an instrumental manner to
enhance the way they are perceived by these observers, thereby
strengthening their bargaining position. It is to these issues, not fully
addressed by current theories, that I now turn.
When a company experiences a bad outcome, it is difficult to as-
certain who or what was responsible. In order to identify the responsi-
bility of management, management's effect on the outcome must be
distinguished from that of extraneous variables. Ironically, it is man-
agers who begin the analysis by gathering information about decisions
that may have led to the outcome. It is they who then use that infor-
mation to distinguish managerial mistakes from other causes.
240 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE EcoNOMIC STRUCrTURE, supra note 11, at 107. The
duty to be informed was not a new addition to the duty of care. For some earlier cases, see
Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920); Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504 (1919); Francis
v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).
241 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUruRE, supra note 11, at 107.
242 Easterbrook and Fischel believe that managers should "spend on knowledge only
to the point where an additional dollar generates that much in better decisions." Id. at
108.
243 Id. Shareholders certainly feel differently about the issue, as was shown in an em-
pirical study by two University of Michigan researchers. See Bradley & Schipani, supra note
64, at 42-69.
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Managers act strategically in undertaking this task of self-exami-
nation. They want to emphasize that the bad outcomes were the
product of random variables rather than managerial mistakes or other
causes they should have foreseen. Their investigative zeal, after the
fact, will leave a lot to be desired. Even more importantly, given the
possibility of bad outcomes and managerial accountability, managers'
efforts to document their actions will be similarly apathetic unless they
are bound by some prior obligation to do so. In other words, no doc-
umentation at all is often better than having the wrong decision on
file. The absence of documentation, managers hope, will be attrib-
uted to the fact that the area of corporate decisionmaking is one of
imperfect information. This problem is not limited to corporations.
There is a long-standing debate among lawyers, especially those in
transactional practice, over the extent to which actions should be doc-
umented. It usually boils down to an issue of whether notes from
meetings and telephone calls, and early drafts of documents, should
be filed away for future reference and protection or be destroyed to
avoid "discovery" in any future litigation.
We can now see how bargaining theory helps us to explain the
Van Gorkom case. The Van Gorkom case in effect requires managers
and board members to leave a "paper trail" documenting actions
taken in reaching corporate decisions.244 This requirement not only
increases the probability that managers' decisions will be good, but
also helps reduce the ex post strategic behavior identified above.
In a sense, Van Gorkom imposes a penalty default rule:2 45 manag-
ers must memorialize their actions, especially in such extraordinary
transactions as takeovers, or they will lose the protection of the busi-
ness judgment rule. The economic rationale behind such a rule is
that it will be cheaper for managers to memorialize their actions than
to try to reconstruct their actions during a later trial. The fact that
managers are encouraged to memorialize their actions will in turn af-
fect the bargaining scenario by making it easier for shareholders to
monitor and enforce their bargains with managers.
One additional advantage of the penalty default rule is that it low-
ers the cost of bargaining without requiring actual disclosure. There
are many reasons why we might want managers to refrain from disclos-
ing certain records and information immediately to shareholders, par-
244 See Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom after Van
Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAw. 1 (1985).
245 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 91 (1989) ("Penalty defaults are designed to give at
least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and there-
fore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer.... [P]enalty defaults are
purposefully set at what the parties would not want-in order to encourage the parties to
reveal information to each other or to third parties (especially the courts).").
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ticularly when the information is of the sort that becomes useful only
during litigation. Requiring too much disclosure, after all, would have
the adverse effect of drowning shareholders in information, not all of
which would be relevant to trading or corporate governance deci-
sions.2 46 The materiality requirement in securities law, for example,
has often been justified on just such a principle.2 47 A penalty default
rule is an effective way, without much legal intervention, to require
memorialization without also mandating immediate disclosure.
There are other advantages to such a rule. For example, after
Van Gorkom, managers and board members have increasingly turned
to third party experts, such as investment bankers and accountants, to
make sure that they are acquiring adequate information to make an
informed decision.2 48 Thus, greater expertise and independence in-
form the decisionmaking process while also providing other means of
monitoring managers, both at the time of the decision and later at the
time of evaluation. This is not to say that we should always require
using third party experts or hiring computer-toting corporate scriven-
ers to document every management decision.2 49 We should still un-
dertake cost-benefit analyses to determine how much documentation
is needed. Bargaining theory allows us, however, to identify both the
additional benefits of requiring informed and documented judgments
and the additional costs of not having such requirements. These costs
and benefits need to be included in any cost-benefit formula.
One possible objection to the Van Gorkom rule is that we do not
need to require managers to memorialize their actions because they
already have an incentive to do So. 2 5 0 This is due to the so-called "un-
246 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976).
247 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). Information is subject to a duty to
disclose if it is material, that is, if there is a substantial likelihood that it would have been
considered significant by a reasonable investor. Id. at 230-32. Materiality depends upon
the probability that an event will come to pass and the magnitude of the event for the
corporation. Id. at 238-41.
248 This has been particularly true of takeovers and other extraordinary transactions.
See E. Norman Veasey, Further Reflections on Court Review ofJudgments of Director . Is theJudi-
cial Process Under Control?, 40 Bus. LAw. 1373, 1381 (1985) ("[I]t is suggested that the Trans
Union case imposes unreasonable exposure to liability and requires artificial preparations
by a board before making business decisions, including an extensive paper trial, multiple
meetings, and the expense of hiring investment bankers.").
249 The Van Gorkom case explicitly rejected such a requirement. See Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985).
250 Anybody who reads the corporate minutes of a large American company will soon
realize that the objective is just the opposite: to minimize the amount of information pre-
served. The rationale is to avoid having any such information disclosed in future litigation.
The corporate minutes in many other countries are much more detailed. These observa-
tions are from my four years in practice in a Wall Street law firm.
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ravelling" effect of information. 251 The argument is as follows: The
market assumes that firms with nothing to hide will adequately memo-
rialize their actions, while finns anticipating problems will memorial-
ize relatively little. In order to gain the trust of the market, managers
will be inclined to memorialize an optimal proportion of their actions
and somehow signal to the market that they have done so. However,
the argument does not apply to the Van Gorkom rule, which requires
memorialization of managerial actions to make it possible to disci-
pline managers in future court proceedings. Because the information
memorialized cannot usually be verified until litigation begins, its con-
straining effect on managers will be diffused. More importantly, as
mentioned in the next subpart (discussing mandatory disclosure), the
unravelling effect is not very powerful in the corporate context, given
that the variables being compared are not discrete. In other words,
the unravelling effect is more useful when analyzing simpler cases
where the variables involved are easier to compare.252
The penalty default rule will not resolve all issues of the ver-
ifiability of information. In some cases it may be impossible to tell
what managers have failed to memorialize. However, two factors will
often help police managerial misbehavior. One is the judicial process,
in which discovery and the threat of prosecution for perjury have a
salutary effect on managerial amnesia. Second, the nature of large
corporations and managerial ranks makes it hard for the managers to
know how much others within the organization know. This increases
the possibility of conviction for perjury.
Of course, we do not want to require the memorialization of too
much information. An excessively stringent requirement would meet
with the futile results of the mapmaker in the Borges story who was
asked to produce as precise a map as possible and wound up produc-
ing a map of the size of the kingdom.253 Requiring memorialization
of extraordinary transactions, such as the takeover in Van Gorkom,
however, should not be too controversial. In addition, memorializa-
tion of managerial action would be appropriate in certain other cir-
cumstances, including investment decisions, especially those that
could lead to managerial entrenchment;25 4 changes in the firm's capi-
tal structure; the adoption of antitakeover provisions; and managerial
251 See DOUGLAs G. BAm Er AL, GAME THEORY AND THE LAw 89 (1994); EAsrERBROOK
& FiscHFi_, THE ECONOMIC STRucruRE, supra note 11, at 289 (discussing managers' incen-
tives to disclose information voluntarily).
252 See infra part HLI.B for more discussion of unravelling effects.
253 See JORGE Luis BoRcES & ADOLFO Bioy CASARM, ExTRAORDINARY TALES 123
(Anthony Kerrigan ed. & trans., 1971).
254 See infra part UL.D for a further discussion of the issue of managerial entrenchment.
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decisionmaking regarding managers' own compensation 255 and
evaluation.
B. Mandatory Disclosure Requirements
Easterbrook and Fischel, as well as other agency theorists, have
argued that mandatory disclosure rules, such as those in the federal
securities laws, are largely unnecessary because managers have market
incentives to disclose adequate information voluntarily. First, better
managers will have an incentive to inform the market of their superior
performance. 256 Second, managers will find it difficult (and costly) to
sell securities unless they can provide the market with sufficient infor-
mation.257 This is, in essence, an "unravelling effect" argument like
that discussed in the prior section. 258 In other words, managers will
have an incentive to disclose because the market will perceive those
who do not as having something to hide. To avoid this perception,
those with good news will disclose it; of the firms remaining, those
with relatively good news will disclose theirs, and so on, until eventu-
ally everyone has disclosed.
As noted above, an unravelling effect is sometimes felt in simple
circumstances. The nature of corporate disclosure, however, makes
the unravelling effect less powerful. For example, where the entities
making disclosures are not easily comparable, unravelling will be less
likely to occur. Take, for example, C & C, Inc. The value of C & C
stock will be a function of the information set that the market pos-
sesses regarding C & C (including information regarding past earn-
ings, current projects, new products, lawsuits filed against the
company, and so on). The information sets of different companies
will intersect in some areas. For example, each information set will
include industry information and general economic news. However,
each will also include company-specific categories. Thus, it will be dif-
ficult for a shareholder to assess whether C & C's failure to disclose
certain types of information, when other companies have made disclo-
sures, indicates that C & C's management is hiding something.
When discussing the federal securities law requirement of
mandatory disclosure by managers, Easterbrook and Fischel state that
"[i] f disclosure is worthwhile to investors, the firm can profit by pro-
255 See infra part III.C for a discussion of managerial compensation issues.
256 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 11, at 256 (anal-
ysis of the reasons underlying a firm's disclosure of information about itself).
257 Id. at 288.
258 For a more detailed discussion of the unravelling effect, see BAIRD, supra note 251,
at 89-90.
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viding it."259 The implicit assumption is that managers will be better
off if "the firm can profit." This is true, however, only to the extent
that the managers' share of the surplus produced exceeds their losses
from disclosing more information; the more information disclosed,
the more carefully shareholders can monitor managers and thereby
weaken managers' bargaining position. In other words, it is important
to focus on the bargaining context to understand the role disclosure
laws play in manager-shareholder relations.
The usefulness of information depends on its timeliness and ve-
racity. These two variables are to a large extent under the control of
managers. As mentioned above, managers have the advantage of cer-
tain informational asymmetries due to their position in the corpora-
tion and the cost to shareholders of acquiring and verifying
information. Thus, managers can use delay, lies, and obfuscation to
enhance their bargaining position vis-a-vis shareholders. Managers
can also retaliate against recalcitrant shareholders by withholding in-
formation from them. This is a particular worry of activist institu-
tional investors, who currently have access to soft information from
managers through analyst meetings and other direct contact with
managers. 260 These are all tools in managers' strategic arsenal. The
federal securities laws' mandatory disclosure and anti-fraud provisions
are examples of mechanisms that limit the use of these strategic
devices. 261
C. Managerial Compensation
Bargaining theory also gives us a different perspective on the is-
sue of managerial compensation. Let us return to the example of C &
C, Inc. set forth in the Introduction-in particular, consider the as-
sumption that managers have continued to give themselves raises even
though the firm has suffered financial losses over the previous five
years. Given the recent controversies regarding management com-
pensation 262-increases in which, ironically, are substantially attribu-
259 EASTERBROOK & FIscHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRucruRE, supra note 11, at 288. This is
because the "firm is in privity with its investors, and they should be able to strike a benefi-
cial bargain." Id. Bargaining theory questions these two conclusions.
260 See Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 13, at 606-07.
261 For example, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78/ (1988),
and the rules adopted thereunder by the Securities and Exchange Commission require
periodic disclosure of information to the capital markets, including an annual report on
Form 10K, quarterly reports on Form 100, and periodic reports on Form 8K, promptly
following any material change. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1994) (Form 10K); 17 C.F.P.
§ 249.308a (1994) (Form 10Q); 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1994) (Form 8K).
262 In a recent empirical study of firms that received a windfall from prevailing in or
settling a lawsuit, the authors found that managers had used a substantial portion of the
windfall to increase their own compensation. See OLIVERJ. BLANCHARD Er AL., NATIONAL
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC PESEARCH, INC., WHAT Do FikMs Do Wrrn CASH WINDFALLS? (Work-
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table to the very stock option plans that agency theorists claimed
would help align managerial incentives with those of sharehold-
ers26 3-this example represents a potentially significant type of bar-
gaining scenario between managers and shareholders. Let us analyze
how the agency theory of the firm and bargaining theory would deal
with this scenario.
Agency theory provides various answers to why managers may
continue to give themselves raises in the face of growing corporate
losses. The main answer begins with the observation that this "unde-
served" compensation is an agency cost.264 Shareholders would only
want to do something about it if the cost of preventing managers from
obtaining this "undeserved" compensation were less than the savings
to the corporation. Because shareholders have not taken action,
agency theorists conclude that managerial acquisition of some
amount of "undeserved" compensation is the optimal outcome in an
imperfect world. According to agency theory, this does not mean that
managers have unfettered discretion in compensating themselves.
Managers are subject to certain market constraints, such as the market
for managers and the market for corporate control. A company
whose managers systematically overcompensate themselves will even-
tually be weeded out through natural selection because the company
will become less competitive in product markets than companies
whose managers are compensated according to what they are worth.
Managers will, under the agency theory view, take all of these con-
straints into account when deciding how much to compensate them-
selves. If these constraints are weak, at some point managers will
overcompensate themselves so much that shareholders will find it cost
effective to discipline them.
There are, however, a number of problems with using agency the-
ory to analyze these problems. Primarily, agency theory provides mini-
mal guidance to lawmakers or corporate actors trying to make
decisions about such problems as managerial overcompensation. The
ing Paper No. 4528, 1993). They stated, "Perhaps the most striking evidence in this paper
[is) ... that a median of 16 percent of the award is given to the top three executives in the
form of extra cash compensation over the next 3 years." Id. at 22.
263 See Baker et al., supra note 44; see a/soJensen, Eclipse, supra note 44, at 64-66; Jensen
& Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 4-6. For example, an empirical study found that where
managers in firms received cash windfalls, the median management ownership rose from
14.5% to 16.5% due to stock and option grants to managers. See BLANcHARn ET AL., supra
note 262, at 22. The recent changes in the management compensation disclosure require-
ments were implemented partly in response to this issue. See Executive Compensation Disclo-
sure, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CGH) 1 85,056 (Oct. 16, 1992) (Release
No. 34-31327).
264 Undeserved compensation is a tangible and particularly visible form of residual
loss. It is therefore an agency cost to the principal. See supra note 47 and accompanying
text.
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guidance that it does provide is at a very abstract level. The principal
message is that the status quo is the best that we can do, since it is the
inevitable product of market constraints and an evolutionary process.
Agency theory tells inquiring lawmakers, "Don't interfere"; and it tells
inquiring corporate actors, "You can't get away with too much, since
you are subject to certain market constraints."
Managers soon realize, however, that these purported market
constraints do in fact allow them a lot of leeway in many areas, includ-
ing setting their compensation packages. One reason is that there is a
time lag between any managerial action and the imposition of disci-
pline by shareholders. As a result, there is time to cover up one's
actions, time for the corporation to return to profitability, time to re-
tire, and time to die. A second reason is the existence of informa-
tional problems such as the ones described earlier in this Article,
which makes it harder for shareholders to know exactly how managers
are acting and the extent to which managers are responsible for unde-
sirable corporate outcomes. As a result, the managers of C & C can
continue to give themselves raises without suffering the consequences.
Agency theory acknowledges that it is costly for shareholders to gather
information about managerial compensation and to discipline manag-
ers. However, agency theory fails to identify the particular costs in-
volved, the ways in which managers can manipulate those costs, and
the proper role of the law in minimizing the costs.
Bargaining theory, by contrast, confronts these issues directly. It
recognizes the propensity of managers to act strategically, viewing
their compensation decisions as elements of the bargaining game over
apportioning net organizational revenue.265 Clearly, managers want
to maximize their share of the substantive stakes. But compensation
also plays a role in bargaining over procedural stakes. For example,
by awarding themselves "golden parachutes" or other expensive forms
of severance payments, managers make it more expensive for share-
holders to get rid of them; consequently, managers will occupy supe-
rior bargaining positions in future negotiations with shareholders.
Whether viewed as retaliation against or increasing the fixed costs to
the shareholders, such measures affect the relative bargaining
strength of the parties.
Bargaining theory also recognizes that managers' incentives and
ability to engage in strategic behavior are enhanced both by informa-
tional asymmetries and by time lags between managerial action and
shareholder discipline. Thus, bargaining theory suggests a relation-
ship less equal and more open to exploitation than does agency
theory.
265 See supra part HAl for a discussion of shareholders and managers bargaining over
substantive stakes.
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By focusing on these issues, bargaining theory properly cautions
shareholders in their dealings with managers and encourages share-
holder vigilance. Bargaining theory also suggests a more prominent
role for regulation and can provide greater guidance to lawmakers
who seek to address such issues.
For example, in 1992 the Securities and Exchange Commission
sought to strengthen the disclosure requirements for managerial com-
pensation in order to ensure that shareholders would receive suffi-
cient information to compare compensation schemes across firms.2 6 6
Bargaining theory tells us that such increased disclosure, which relates
solely to substantive stakes, will by itself prove insufficient, because
managers will continue to use compensation in strategic ways to bol-
ster their future bargaining positions. With this in mind, regulators
can adopt more finely-tailored rules to encourage disclosure of strate-
gic behavior (perhaps through penalty defaults), to encourage bar-
gaining between shareholders and managers over these issues, or to
restrict strategic uses of certain compensation packages that yield a
net reduction in social welfare.2 67
D. Managerial Entrenchment
Practically speaking, it is difficult to remove managers who are
underperforming, 268 and managers have ample incentive to make re-
moval as hard as possible. Managers also have the ability to entrench
themselves by taking actions that will make it costlier for shareholders
to remove them. Managers accomplish this particularly through their
control of corporate assets and investment decisions. The following
example will help illustrate the potential for managerial
entrenchment.
Assume that the managers of C & C, Inc. want to keep their jobs
and are faced with two alternative investment opportunities. Invest-
ment A has a higher net present value than Investment B. Investment
B, however, has certain characteristics that are desirable to managers:
(1) if the investment goes awry, the managers can more easily explain
266 Executive Compensation Disclosure, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,056.
267 For example, this would be the case if their sole use were strategic, if they led to
costs that neither party would otherwise incur, and if these costs exceeded the net benefit
of the package.
268 Technically it is not that difficult. Under state law, the power to remove managers
is given to the board of directors. Usually only a majority vote by the board is required to
remove the managers. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1993). When the board
refuses to remove the managers, the shareholders can vote to remove the directors. There
are certain technical requirements for the removal of directors. See, e.g., id. § 141(k) (re-
moval with and without cause). In addition, as was noted above, there are numerous non-
legal roadblocks to removing directors. In particular, the collective action problem in
shareholder voting and managerial control of proxy statements prove problematic.
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the poor performance on the basis of extraneous factors rather than
bad managing; and (2) it requires long-term commitments that could
be revoked by new managers only at a very high cost, which would
make a takeover or any other type of change in managers less attrac-
tive. 269 Rational managers will choose Investment B if the benefits of
further entrenchment exceed the costs.
The received agency theory of the firm assumes that market, con-
tractual, aid evolutionary constraints greatly restrict the ability of
managers to use their control over corporate assets and investment
policy strategically. Agency theorists recognize that managers will
have some discretion in making decisions that will foster self-en-
trenchment 270 the focus, however, has been on the secondary effects
of such decisions on the market mechanisms that constrain manage-
rial behavior.271 To the extent that managers can take actions which
per se increase the costs or decrease the likelihood of shareholder
discipline, the markets for corporate control and for managers will be
less effective as constraints on managerial behavior.
Economists who have begun exploring how managers use corpo-
rate investment policy to entrench themselves have concluded that
the market constraints relied on by agency theorists are thereby ren-
dered largely ineffective.2 72 In reality, managers have great discretion
to make investment decisions that have the effect of making existing
269 The more the current managers can tie the hands of future managers, the less
flexibility those new managers will have to change company policy. Thus, the benefit of
hiring the new team of managers is reduced.
270 During the 1980s a whole literature developed regarding management entrench-
ment during takeovers. See, e.g., KNIGHTs, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOs-
TILE TAKEOVER (John C. Coffee,Jr. et al. eds., 1988); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Roe,
supra note 134. However, what I have in mind here is entrenchment carried out not dur-
ing takeover battles but in the day-to-day managing of the company. See STIGLITZ & EDIN,
supra note 8; Schleifer & Vishny, supra note 158.
271 For example, Michael Jensen recognizes the conflict of interests surrounding the
payout of cash to shareholders, given that paying out such cash reduces the resources
under management's control and makes it more likely that managers would be subjected
to the disciplining effect of the capital markets (because they would be required to tap
these markets to raise capital). Shareholders have an interest in having managers pay out
any "free cash flows" (that is, any cash flows in excess of that which is required to fund all
positive net present value projects). SeeJensen, Free Cash Flow, supra note 5, at 323. Jensen
argues that the market for corporate control will help constrain managers' retention of
free cash flows, by making it more likely that the relevant corporation will be taken over so
that the acquiring company can get to the free cash flows. Id at 328. Jensen also views the
leveraging of corporations as a way that managers contractually agree to pay out free cash
flows in the way of interest payments, so that the institutions receiving the interest pay-
ments can reinvest them more efficiently. Id. at 324.
272 See STIGLrrZ & EDLN, supra note 3, at 1-3. They argue that "neither the take-over
mechanisms nor the shareholder-voting mechanism may exercise effective discipline" and
that informational asymmetries provide managers with great discretion. Id. at 2; see also
Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 158, at 122 (arguing that the disciplinary forces provided by
the board of directors, the managerial labor market, the products market and the market
for corporate control "do not appear to be totally effective").
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managers more valuable to the firm than a replacement management
team.273 These observations are consistent with bargaining theory's
focus on managers' use of strategic behavior to gain bargaining advan-
tages in subsequent bargaining rounds.
Bargaining theory focuses on how the existence of informational
asymmetries makes it easier for managers to entrench themselves.
The shareholders of C & C, for example, would find it very costly to
acquire the information needed to ascertain the exact characteristics
of Investments A and B, and to discover whether there were other
possible investment options, such as Investment C, that managers did
not consider or considered but rejected for entrenchment reasons.
Bargaining theory focuses on the effects of fixed costs that managers
can impose on shareholders through such investment decisions.
By focusing on the strategic nature of investment decisions we
can better address questions that are critical from a corporate govern-
ance point of view. How should shareholders analyze issues of en-
trenchment when deciding how and whether to discipline managers?
How should lawmakers react to entrenchment by managers? If share-
holders focus on the procedural implications of the entrenching acts
of managers, they will view these entrenchment decisions as more
costly than the lens of agency theory admits. Bargaining theory recog-
nizes the costs by viewing entrenchment decisions as part of the proce-
dural stakes. In such cases, shareholders should be willing to
undertake more direct disciplining actions.
The challenge for lawmakers will be to make the bargaining inter-
action between shareholders and managers more efficient. This may
involve more stringent disclosure requirements or compulsory memo-
rialization of the managerial decisionmaking process, to make it easier
for shareholders to discipline managers. A penalty default scheme
like the one discussed above would serve these functions: for exam-
ple, managers who failed to adequately memorialize their decision-
making process would be denied the protection of the business
judgment rule.2 74 However, lawmakers should be hesitant about re-
stricting the types of investments that managers can undertake or the
types of capital structures and governance provisions that they can
273 See STIGLZ & EDLIN, supra note 3, at 5 ("The information imperfections which
underlie managerial discretion provide management with the opportunity to obtain rents,
that is, payments in excess of their opportunity costs."); Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 158,
at 122 (arguing that managers can "counter disciplinary forces by entrenching themselves,
that is, by making themselves valuable to shareholders and costly to replace").
274 See supra notes 244-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the rule in
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), helps encourage such actions by
managers.
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adopt,275 unless such restrictions would make it easier for sharehold-
ers to bargain with managers. 27 6
E. Firm-Specific Human Capital
Easterbrook and Fischel argue that changing managers is often
costly, since managers' investment in firm-specific human capital will
be lost. Thus, they conclude that "[b]oth sides try to avoid these costs,
the threat of which induces both to perform well in the first place."277
However, if their acquired capital is useful in other employment, man-
agers will stand to lose less than shareholders. In addition, sharehold-
ers may have insufficient information about the value of managerial
human capital-after all, managers have an informational advantage
in that regard.
Assume a firm with one shareholder and one manager. The man-
ager and the corporation are in New York, and the shareholder is in
Tibet. The shareholder, who is not involved in the day-to-day manage-
ment of the corporation, has only that information about the corpora-
tion that the manager gives her.278 The shareholder is dissatisfied
with the performance of the company and is thinking of removing the
manager or drastically cutting the manager's compensation. The
manager has told the shareholder that any cut in her salary would
lead her to quit the company.
The shareholder is uncertain about three things: (1) whether the
manager's threat to quit is credible; (2) whether the poor perform-
275 These last two restrictions are of the type encouraged by Easterbrook and Fischel in
their arguments against takeover defenses. SeeEasterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role supra
note 134, at 1201-04.
276 Commentators who favor rules allowing the target's manager to solicit competing
bids seek to increase the bargaining power of managers vis-A-vis the hostile bidder, so as to
give time for an auction to develop. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Compet-
ing Tender Offers. A Reply and Extensio 35 STAN. L Rrv. 23 (1982). Decisions like Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), also help en-
courage bargaining by restricting the bargaining power of managers once an auction situa-
tion has developed. In Revlon, the court stated that "concern for non-stockholder interests
is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in progress, and the object no
longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bid-
der." Id. at 182. Recent takeover battles for Paramount and Grumman have shown that
many times, alternative bidders willing to enter into an auction can do so quite rapidly. See
Laura Landro & Johnnie L. Roberts, Mixed Media: QVC's $9.5 Billion Bid for Paramount
Brings Industry Titans to Fray, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1993, at Al.
277 EASrEpmROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRucruRE, supra note 11, at 97.
278 In other words, assume that the shareholder has the characteristics of a public
shareholder except that she does not face the usual collective action problem in share-
holder voting. For an explanation of why this assumption makes more sense now that insti-
tutional investors are becoming more involved in shareholder voting, see supra notes 163-
69 and accompanying text. Making this assumption may also yield insights into why the
collective action problem and the conflict of interest of money managers may not be the
only barriers to shareholder activism.
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ance of the company is due to the manager's actions or to exogenous
factors; and (3) how much firm-specific human capital the manager
has acquired 2 9-capital that will be lost if the manager is fired and
replaced by another manager who needs to acquire the same
knowledge.
Easterbrook and Fischel argue that in a situation like this both
the shareholder and the manager will try to avoid the costs of replac-
ing the manager. The threat of the costs incurred by replacing the
manager, they believe, will induce both parties to perform well to be-
gin with.28° This is another example of agency theory's assumption
that an efficient bargain will always be struck.
There is no reason to believe, however, that the manager and
shareholder will not act strategically in trying to maximize the benefits
that each receives. Bargaining theory allows us to analyze this prob-
lem more thoroughly by focusing on the existence of a bargaining
region and the fact that this will lead to strategic behavior and the
possibility of a bargaining breakdown.
In the example under consideration, a shareholder is trying to
decide whether to replace the current manager. Assume that the cur-
rent manager is worth $200,000 a year to the firm. A replacement
manager could be hired for a salary of only $100,000 a year, but would
be worth only $100,000 to the firm because she does not possess the
firm-specific human capital that the current manager possesses. Thus,
the question posed to the shareholder is how much to pay the current
manager. The $100,000 extra that this manager is worth to the com-
pany produces a bargaining surplus to be divided between the current
manager and the shareholder. One possibility is to pay the current
manager $200,000. But that would give her the whole bargaining sur-
plus. So we would expect the shareholder to offer an amount less
than $200,000. There is no assurance, however, that the parties will
reach a bargain. If they cannot reach a bargain, the shareholder and
the current manager will lose the whole bargaining surplus. 28' Given
the uncertainties surrounding the bargaining context, one cannot as-
279 In the course of her employment the manager will acquire two types of human
capital: firm-specific and general human capital. General human capital is knowledge and
expertise that is equally valuable in another firm. Firm-specific human capital is knowl-
edge that loses all or most of its value if the manager leaves the firm. SeeWILuAMSON, supra
note 70, at 254-56 (describing firm-specific capital); Gary S. Becker, Investment in Human
Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 J. POL. ECON. 9 (Supp. Oct. 1962) (survey of general
human capital).
280 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRucruRE, supra note 11, at 97.
281 In other words, the shareholder needs to hire a new manager who is worth only
$100,000 to the company. The current manager will now have to try her luck in the mar-
ket for managers, where per our stipulations, her services (without the firm-specific human
capital, which she loses when she leaves the firm) will be worth only $100,000.
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sume that the equilibrium outcome will be that a bargain is always
reached. 28 2
We can learn a number of things from this example. One is that
the existence of firm-specific human capital will create a bargaining
region. Second, both the shareholder and manager can be expected
to expend resources on strategic behavior to shore up their'bargain-
ing positions. The manager will act strategically when investing in
human capital. She will want to invest in as little firm-specific human
capital as possible. She will, however, need to invest in some firm-
specific human capital because if she is fungible, she can easily be
replaced with another manager. At the same time, the manager will
expend resources trying to convince the shareholder that her accumu-
lation of firm-specific human capital has made her indispensable.
The shareholder will want the manager to invest in as much firm-
specific human capital as is necessary to run the company at its opti-
mal level. If the shareholder often threatens to replace managers or
repeatedly carries out the threat, then the managers, who know that
they may not be on the job for very long, will underinvest in firm-
specific human capital.
Thus we see that both shareholders and managers have incentives
to engage in certain strategic behavior. They will therefore incur cer-
tain expenditures in anticipation of bargaining. This leads to the dis-
sipation of some or all of the bargaining surplus or may lead to a total
bargaining breakdown.283
F. Fiduciary Duties: Mandatory versus Enabling Provisions
A recent controversy in corporate law revolves around whether
corporate law prescribes or should prescribe mandatory or enabling
rules. 2 84 Bernard Black has argued that by and large corporate law is
trivial because it is made up largely of non-mandat6iry rules.2 85 Some
agency theorists have argued that shareholders should be allowed to
contract around management's fiduciary duties.28 6 Again, agency the-
282 See Cooter & Marks, supra note 136, at 232-33.
283 One can complicate this bargaining game by moving away from an all or nothing
game to one in which there are multiple offers. In such cases, asymmetrical bargaining
power plays a larger role.
284 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An
Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1618 (1989); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corpo-
rate Contract, supra note 22; Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. RV. 1549 (1989).
285 See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84
Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990) (Corporate law is trivial because "it does not prevent com-
panies-managers and investors together-from establishing any set of governance rules
they want.").
286 See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 66.
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orists rely on the existence of contractual and market constraints to
argue that fiduciary duties should not be mandatory.28 7
The bargaining theory of the firm provides some additional justi-
fications for being cautious about allowing shareholders to contract
around fiduciary duties. Under bargaining theory, fiduciary duties
can be seen as a constraint on managerial bargaining power. Given
their informational advantage and control over the resources and
decisionmaking processes of the company, managers unconstrained
by fiduciary duties will be tempted to make and carry out certain
threats that hurt shareholders.288 There are many examples, espe-
cially in the takeover context, of managers adopting strategies that
allowed them to stay in power at the expense of shareholders.28 9
G. Governance Structures and Bargaining Theory
Oliver Williamson has argued that managers have incentives to
develop governance structures, such as the board of directors, to pre-
vent opportunistic behavior in situations not contemplated by the
original corporate contract. According to Williamson, the board of
directors "arises endogenously, as a means by which to safeguard the
investments" of shareholders,290 and to prevent the penalty the firm
will face in the capital markets if shareholders are not safeguarded
against "expropriation and egregious mismanagement."291 William-
son's implicit assumption is that managers will gain more from adopt-
ing these governance structures than they will lose from greater
monitoring by shareholders, because if not, these governance struc-
tures would not have survived.2 92
Bargaining theory casts doubts on this conclusion. A major con-
tention of bargaining theory is that rational actors do not automati-
cally undertake every action that produces a collective benefit.293 A
self-interested decisionmaker takes two factors into account: (1) the
size of the pie and (2) how the pie will be sliced. While both share-
287 Rd at 18-53.
288 Where shareholders greatly discount the future (that is, where they need to be able
to leave the firm quickly by selling their shares), they are at a particular disadvantage,
because managers can threaten to hurt the company's earnings in the short term as retalia-
tion against these shareholders.
289 Adopting anti-takeover devices, paying greenmail, adopting golden parachutes,
and actively opposing tender offers are some examples.
290 WILtAMSON, supra note 70, at 306.
291 Id. at 305.
292 Cf id. at 22 (noting the plausibility of the general assumption of "the efficacy of
competition to sort between more and less efficient modes and to shift resources in favor
of the former"). For a critique of this argument from evolution, see supra notes 81-85 and
accompanying text.
293 See Cooter, supra note 131, at 20-21 (developing a bargaining game in which, at
equilibrium, bargaining sometimes breaks down and both parties are worse off).
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holders and managers have an interest in increasing the size of the pie
(that is, their collective benefit), both groups have the primary objec-
tive of maximizing their own wealth. If making the pie bigger will
result in a smaller distribution for managers, managers will opt for the
smaller pie.294
Determining the distribution of benefits will involve strategic be-
havior by the parties. The distributional conflict that ensues may lead
to decisional deadlocks or bargaining breakdowns or to the wasting
away of any potential collective benefit, particularly in situations in
which there are informational asymmetries.295 For example, given
that the parties will be bargaining in more than one period, it is con-
ceivable for one of them to threaten to make the pie smaller in the
current period to gain a strategic advantage in future periods. There-
fore, bargaining theory suggests that existing governance structures
do not exist because they are efficient. Rather, they result from ma-
neuvering by parties who are not necessarily interested in maximizing
the aggregate welfare.
H. Politics, Bargaining, and Institutions
Politics plays a strong role in the shareholder-manager bargain-
ing relationship. Although agency theorists have not ignored politics
altogether, they have focused their efforts in two areas: (1) identifying
the socially optimal contract or governance structure and (2) explain-
ing the role that government regulation has played in undermining
this optimal structure.2 96 In agency theory, government regulation is
an exogenous variable.
This approach is not viable because it is impossible to divorce
politics from shareholder-manager relations.2 97 Managers and share-
294 Williamson fails to explain why managers would voluntarily engage in reducing
agency costs if it led to their getting a smaller share of corporate distributions. KNIGirr,
supra note 86, at 3-84.
295 Robert Cooter has drawn a distinction between the Coase theorem, with its assump-
tion that parties will reach a bargain, and what he terms the Hobbes theorem. The latter
theorem holds that absent a Leviathan, no agreement will be reached. See Cooter, supra
note 131, at 18 (The Hobbesian view "is based upon the belief that people will exercise
their worst threats against each other unless there is a third party to coerce both of
them."). In essence, agency theory assumes that both parties will reach a Coasean bargain
in which they agree to split the collective good.
296 Easterbrook and Fischel tell us in The Economic Structure of Corporate Law that the
normative thesis of their book is that corporate law should contain those terms that most
parties would have negotiated if they had bargained ahead of time (assuming that the cost
of negotiating for every contingency were sufficiendy low) and that the positive thesis of
their book is that corporate law almost always conforms to this model. See EASrEEBROOK &
FIscHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRucruRE, supra note 11, at 15.
297 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDozo
L. REsv. 709 (1987); William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison, Corporate Chartering An
Exploration in the Economics of Legal Change, 23 ECON. INQUIRY 585 (1985).
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holders constantly try to convince legislators and courts to change the
legal rules regulating their relationship. Managers and shareholders
attempt to alter the bargaining context by introducing third parties,
such as the government.298 The emergence of state antitakeover stat-
utes during the late 1980s provides a perfect example of managerial
attempts to increase their bargaining advantage in this manner. Re-
cent changes in the proxy rules, and management compensation dis-
closure requirements demonstrate the success of shareholder activism
in influencing government action. However, management made seri-
ous attempts to block adoption of these measures and succeeded in
watering them down considerably. 299 The bargaining theory of the
firm makes this political conflict an endogenous variable by treating it
as part of the procedural stakes being divided by shareholders and
managers. It therefore provides both a better description of the firm
and better guidance to the relevant players.
CONCLUSION
This Article has introduced concepts and paradigms from the
game theoretical analysis of bargaining in order to refocus the analysis
of shareholder-manager relationships on the role of the parties' strate-
gic behavior. I have argued that the relationship between sharehold-
ers and managers can best be conceptualized as an ongoing
bargaining game. The bargaining theory that I develop responds to
some of the weaknesses of the currently prevailing agency theory of
the firm by bringing the role of bargaining to the forefront of the
analysis of corporate interactions.
The goal of this Article has not been to provide a complete refu-
tation of the received agency theory of the firm. Rather, I have tried
to shake off some of the underlying assumptions that have restricted
the objects to which that theory has attended. Certainly, the agency
theory of the firm has provided valuable insights. As we have seen, the
collapse of the takeover market and the rise of institutional investor
activism have called into question some of the key assumptions of the
agency theory of the firm. The bargaining paradigm therefore is par-
ticularly useful because it provides a framework for analyzing man-
ager-shareholder relations in this new environment.
Bargaining theory attempts to deal with the fact that managers
use their discretion to increase both their compensation packages and
their bargaining strength in anticipation of future bargaining rounds
with shareholders. In other words, shareholders and managers bar-
298 See EIsTER, supra note 191, at 87-89; NORTH, supra note 68, at 58.
299 See comment letters to the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection
with Communication Among Shareholders [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,051 (Oct. 16, 1992) (Exchange Act Release No. 31,326).
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gain over both substantive and procedural stakes. Bargaining theory
differs from agency theory both practically and methodologically: it
includes a more intent focus on such concepts as the strategic behav-
ior of managers and shareholders; the bargaining costs produced by
this strategic behavior; the dynamic, ongoing nature of the share-
holder-manager relationship; the role of managerial discretion and
informational asymmetries in this relationship; and the issue of insti-
tutional emergence and change. By emphasizing these issues, bar-
gaining theory attempts to provide more helpful guidance than
agency theory, both to lawyers involved in structuring corporate trans-
actions and to judges and legislators contemplating corporate policy.
A more complete analysis of the bargaining context within the
firm would include as players other economic actors, such as credi-
tors, employees, and board members. The bargaining theory outlined
in this Article will hopefully provide a model that can eventually be
expanded to include these other constituencies. With this Article, I
hope to have at least shown how bargaining theory rephrases old ques-
tions and asks new ones, thus explaining more completely how coop-
eration and conflict shape corporate interactions.
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